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Gregory Klass 
Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery 
abstract.   There is a longstanding debate about whether courts should enforce contract 
terms purporting to limit the parties’ liability for fraud. It is less-often noticed that many 
contracts are designed to incorporate fraud liability by requiring one party to make 
representations about her performance that, if false, can satisfy the elements of deceit. Such 
contractual representations are best understood as members of a broader, hitherto 
underappreciated category of contract terms: duties designed to increase the other party’s 
chances of recovering for breach. Examples include the duty to keep records, to share 
information about performance, to permit audits, and not to hide breach. This Article shows that 
the logic of proving proximate harm from the breach of such terms entails that legal liability for 
such breach often makes a practical difference only when it includes penalties, punitive damages, 
or other extracompensatory measures. The Article also demonstrates that most of the costs of 
extracompensatory remedies (such as deterring efficient breach) do not apply when those 
remedies are attached to duties to cooperate in recovery, and that, in many cases, adopting such 
duties is a better solution to underenforcement than damages multipliers. Parties now contract 
for liability in fraud, where punitive damages are available, because they cannot get these 
remedies in contract. The practical upshot is a new argument against rulings, most recently via a 
broad reading of the economic loss doctrine, that there can be no liability in fraud for lies that are 
also breaches. Rather than serving the oft-stated goal of protecting the parties’ contractually 
chosen allocation of risk, these rules defeat party choice. Even better, however, would be 
exceptions to the rules against penalties and punitive damages when those remedies are attached 
to the breach of a duty to cooperate in recovery.  
author.   Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I want to thank Jennifer 
Arlen, Guido Calabresi, Richard Craswell, Kevin Davis, Chris Elmendorf, John Mikhail, Jed 
Purdy, Chris Sanchirico, Christian Turner, Bill Vukowich, Ethan Yale, and Kathy Zeiler, each of 
whom added to the ideas in this Article through discussion or comment. I owe special thanks to 
Ian Ayres, who suggested that I write down these thoughts during a walk in the Arizona desert. 
The Article also benefited from faculty workshops at the University of Virginia Law School and 
Georgetown University Law Center, and from discussion at the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty 
Forum. Jason Daniels provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I thank Sanjukta Misra, 
who not only provided input along the way, but is the work’s sine qua non. 
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introduction 
In 1984, the city of Richmond contracted with McDevitt Street Bovis for 
the construction of a new baseball stadium. The stadium was built, but a 
decade later the city discovered deterioration in the concrete tubes supporting 
the cantilevered roof, caused by McDevitt’s breach of its contractual duty to fill 
the tubes with grout. The city sued, claiming both breach of contract and 
fraud, the latter based on false certificates of completion and other documents 
McDevitt had submitted. In Richmond Metropolitan Authority v. McDevitt Street 
Bovis, Inc., the Virginia Supreme Court held that because the contract required 
McDevitt to provide the certificates and other documents, misrepresentations 
in them might give the city a right to damages for breach, but could not give 
rise to liability in fraud.1 
McDevitt is a good example of how courts police the border between 
contract and tort, protecting contract against, among other things, incursion by 
the punitive damages available in tort. But consider the holding’s effect on 
Virginia contractors’ decisions whether to submit accurate certificates of 
completion. Restricting recovery to the compensatory measures available in 
contract means that a Virginia builder who has breached its construction duties 
incurs little or no additional liability when it files a false certificate. The false 
certificate harms the purchaser first and foremost if it prevents her from 
discovering and recovering for nonconforming work.2 To prove that harm—
and even that the certificate was false—the purchaser must first show that the 
work was nonconforming, i.e., that but for the false certificate, she would have 
recovered for breach. But if the purchaser can show nonconforming work, then 
she already has a winning claim for breach of the underlying construction duty, 
which will compensate her for her losses. That is, if the purchaser can show 
that the false certificate harmed her, it did not. The Virginia Supreme Court’s 
decision to limit recovery for false certificates of completion to the 
compensatory damages available in contract renders legal liability for breach of 
the certification requirement irrelevant. 
This strange situation is not limited to certificates of completion in the 
building industry. The above argument, or one like it, applies to any contract 
 
1.  507 S.E.2d 344, 347 (Va. 1998). In addition to the false certificates of compliance, Richmond 
claimed constructive fraud based on McDevitt’s decision to seal the ends of the tubes with 
grout, giving the false impression that they had been filled. The Virginia Supreme Court 
held that these allegations were “nothing more than allegations of negligent performance of 
contractual duties,” and therefore nonactionable as constructive fraud. Id. 
2.  There may be other harms as well, such as making recovery more expensive. I consider the 
effectiveness of compensatory damages for these harms in infra Subsection I.B.2. 
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term whose purpose is to make it easier for the promisee to discover and prove 
breach. Common examples include royalty reports, recordkeeping 
requirements, certificates of compliance, and auditing rights. Such terms 
belong to a hitherto underappreciated genus of contract terms: duties to 
undertake acts that promote the other side’s recovery for breach. I will use 
“obstruction of recovery” or “obstruction” to refer both to promisor actions 
that aim to avoid legal liability and to the failure to act in ways that would 
assist in the recovery of damages due where there is a duty to do so. I will use 
“cooperation in recovery,” or simply “cooperation,” to designate 
nonobstruction.3 Where one side is particularly worried that she might be 
unable to recover for any breach, the other side might offer to undertake a 
contractual duty to cooperate in recovery—to agree, for instance, not to hide 
nonperformance, to keep complete records, or to provide information about 
performance. 
But here’s the problem: to recover compensatory damages for the breach of 
a duty to cooperate, a plaintiff must be able to demonstrate harm. The primary 
harm of an obstructive breach is that it prevents the promisee from recovering 
for breach of the underlying, or first-order, duty. Showing that harm requires 
independent proof of first-order breach—that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
damages she did not recover. But if the plaintiff can prove first-order breach, 
she can recover on that basis—which means that the obstructive breach has not 
harmed her. The upshot is a catch-22: a plaintiff can show obstructive harm 
only if she has not suffered it. 
The way to break out of the circle is to attach extracompensatory 
remedies—remedies that are not tied to the plaintiff’s verifiable losses—to 
obstructive breach. While the received wisdom is that optimal remedies for 
breach are always at or near the expectation measure, this cannot be so when it 
comes to duties to cooperate in recovery.4 If such contract terms are to make a 
practical difference, they must be backed by punitive damages, penalties or 
other remedies neither conditioned on nor limited to compensation for harm 
done. 
 
3.  This is a very thin concept of cooperation. My technical use of the term is obviously 
different from more demanding or normatively laden concepts of cooperation. See, e.g., 
Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, in FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS 
ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 93, 103-05 (1999). 
4.  The received wisdom should no longer be that compensatory damage measures are the only 
efficient remedies. See Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 YALE 
L.J. 568 (2006); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). 
Special transactional situations where the received wisdom does not apply are collected in 
Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33 
(2003). 
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At present, courts will not enforce a penalty or punitive damages clause, 
which brings the analysis back to the potentially positive role of fraud liability. 
There is a longstanding debate within the courts and legal scholarship about 
whether parties should be able to contract out of liability for their fraudulent 
misrepresentations.5 What has not been noticed is that many agreements are 
structured to opt into such liability using terms that require one party to 
represent that it is not in breach (by submitting, for example, a certificate of 
completion). When false, such representations not only breach the contract, 
but can satisfy the elements of fraud and support a claim for punitive damages. 
The contractual duty to share information about performance can be secured 
by the extracompensatory remedies available in fraud. 
The existence of such contract terms suggests that parties want effective 
duties to cooperate in recovery. And their utility provides additional support 
for a thesis Ian Ayres and I have developed elsewhere: that the 
extracompensatory remedies available in tort can have “well-defined 
function[s] within the apparatus of the law of contracts.”6 Yet, as exemplified 
in McDevitt, many courts are uncomfortable with this incursion of 
extracompensatory remedies into the world of contracts and have found ways 
to exclude fraud liability for acts that are also breaches. The most recent trend 
in this direction involves an expansive reading of the economic loss rule to bar 
liability for fraud in the performance. This Article argues that such rulings are 
mistaken and that courts should recognize the positive role fraud liability can 
play in contracts. But the fraud solution is second best. A better solution would 
be an exception to the rules against penalties and punitive damages when those 
remedies are attached to contractual duties to cooperate in recovery. 
Robert Scott and George Triantis have recently observed that “contracts 
scholars [have focused] principally on the substantive terms and not on the 
ability of the parties to regulate the procedural course of their future 
 
5.  The most significant recent decision is the Delaware Chancery Court’s holding in ABRY 
Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition L.L.C. that “when a seller intentionally misrepresents a 
fact embodied in a contract—that is, when a seller lies—public policy will not permit a 
contractual provision to limit the remedy of the buyer to a capped damage claim.” 891 A.2d 
1032, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also id. at 1055-62 (discussing other holdings and 
authorities). For recent scholarly discussions, see Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, 
the Parol Evidence Rule and Pre-Contractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1999); 
and Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business 
Acquisition Agreements and the Right To Lie, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2007). 
6.  IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW OF MISREPRESENTED INTENT 8 
(2005). 
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enforcement.”7 This is confirmed by the scholarly neglect of duties to cooperate 
in recovery. Such duties are attempts to regulate contract enforcement.  This 
Article therefore fills in the picture of how parties contract for the case of 
breach.8 
The Article’s conclusions also bear on an old dispute about Holmes’s 
famous dictum that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a 
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing 
else.”9 This “Holmesian heresy” is sometimes read to mean that, as far as the 
law is concerned, the promisor does not have a duty to perform, but an option 
to perform or pay damages.10 Holmes himself rejected the alternative-promise 
reading, explaining that “the statement that the effect of a contract is the 
assumption of the risk of a future event does not mean that there is a second 
subsidiary promise to assume that risk, but that the assumption follows as a 
consequence directly enforced by the law, without the promisor’s co-
 
7.  Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 
814, 857 (2006). For an example of the neglect in a famous source, see L.L. Fuller & William 
R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 58 (1936) (“If 
a contract represents a kind of private law, it is a law which usually says nothing at all about 
what shall be done when it is violated. A contract is in this respect like an imperfect statute 
which provides no penalties, and which leaves it to the courts to find a way to effectuate its 
purposes.”). 
8.  The conclusions of this Article are consistent with results in other areas of the law. See, e.g., 
Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-
Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569 (2006) (analyzing sanctions for tax evasion and 
avoidance); Ian C. Wiener, Note, Running Rampant: The Imposition of Sanctions and the Use 
of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L.J. 2175 (1992) (discussing optimal 
penalties for criminal flight). 
9.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897), reprinted in 
110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 995 (1997). 
10.  See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 58 (2003) (“Holmes 
pointed out that in a regime in which the sanction for breach of contract is merely an award 
of compensatory damages to the victim, the entire practical effect of signing a contract is 
that by doing so one obtains an option to break it.”); Avery Wiener Katz, The Option 
Element in Contracting, 90 VA. L. REV. 2187, 2202 (2004) (“In option terminology, we can 
restate Holmes’s point by saying that the promisor holds a call option to buy her way out of 
the contract by paying a strike price equal to the value of court-awarded damages.”); Robert 
E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in 
Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1429 n.1 (2004) (“It is well known that contract 
damages effectively give the promisor an option between performing the promise or 
breaching and paying damages. The classic statement is by Justice Holmes . . . .”); Seanna 
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 727 (2007) 
(“Justice Holmes famously declared that a contract to perform should be understood not as 
a promise to perform full stop, but as a promise either to perform or to pay damages.”). 
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operation.”11 This Article examines what happens when the parties do make a 
“second subsidiary promise” to pay damages—or at least to cooperate in their 
recovery. Its surprising result is that mandatory rules limiting contract 
damages to compensatory measures mean that even when there is a second 
subsidiary promise, legal liability for its breach does not make a practical 
difference. 
Part I of the Article describes why some parties, including promisors who 
know they might breach, should want to contract for legally enforceable duties 
not to obstruct recovery, and explains why currently available contract 
remedies—which are limited to compensation for actual losses—are often 
insufficient to enforce such duties. The core reason is the catch-22 described 
above: the promisee who can prove obstructive harm has not suffered it. In 
some cases, the effects of the catch-22 can be reduced through recovery for 
other harms of obstructive breach, such as delayed compensation and higher 
litigation costs, or by liquidating damages. But these alternative grounds of 
recovery do not sufficiently protect against obstruction in all contexts. 
Part II considers three forms that contractually specified extracompensatory 
remedies for obstructive breach might take: the right to terminate the contract, 
an adverse inference with respect to first-order breach, and penalties or 
punitive damages. The right to terminate works only where the promisor 
attaches significant value to the continued existence of the contract, and where 
the promisee is not likely already to have the right to terminate based on a 
showing of first-order breach. Nor is the adverse inference solution effective 
where the promisee has separate proof of first-order breach. I conclude that 
only penalties and punitive damages provide generally effective remedies for 
obstructive breach. The law of most states presently prevents parties from 
contracting for either. 
Part III describes how, with no contractual solution available, duties to 
cooperate might be secured through the law of torts. The most important 
judicial step in this direction was California’s failed experiment with punitive 
damages for postbreach obstruction in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service v. 
Standard Oil Co. of California.12 A more promising approach can be found in 
parties’ attempts to contract for representations of performance backed by 
fraud liability, though many courts have closed off this path by adopting 
expansive readings of the economic loss rule or similar doctrines. Finally, the 
 
11.  OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 302 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1944) (1881); see 
also Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and Tortious 
Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1085-93 (2000). 
12.  686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 
P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995). 
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parties can secure limited benefits with representations of intent to cooperate in 
recovery, again backed by the law of fraud. 
Part IV completes the analysis by arguing that not only are 
extracompensatory remedies necessary for effective no-obstruct duties, but the 
benefits of cooperative duties are worth the costs of those remedies. Many 
familiar costs of penalties and punitive damages, such as deterring efficient 
breach, do not apply when they are attached to obstructive breach. And no-
obstruct clauses backed by penalties or punitive damages are often a cheaper 
alternative than a more familiar solution to underenforcement: damage 
multipliers. 
Before jumping into the analysis, a few words about method. My argument 
employs a broadly instrumentalist perspective, in that it assumes that among 
contract law’s primary aims is facilitating transactions that would otherwise be 
prevented by lack of trust.13 In order to capture practical reasoning in the 
absence of trust, I employ nontechnical economic analysis of the self-interested 
calculations of individuals entering into and acting within legally binding 
agreements. I assume both that each party engages in such cost-benefit analysis 
to decide whether to enter into and how to perform under the contract, and 
that each tries to anticipate and influence the cost-benefit analysis of his or her 
counterpart. In undertaking this analysis, I generally assume that the only 
curbs on self-interest are legal ones—that is, the prospect of legal liability for 
bad acts. This is of course a theoretical fiction: extralegal norms, sanctions, and 
other consequences also enter into the mix. Nor is every decision in a 
contractual relationship based on such heartless cost-benefit analysis. But if 
contract law has a function in structuring the ongoing relationship between the 
parties, it is to substitute where nonlegal mechanisms for coordination, 
cooperation, or collaboration do not suffice. Ignoring extralegal norms, 
incentives, and reasons is an analytic device for exploring how legal 
mechanisms might substitute for them. 
 
13.  See generally DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF 
CONTRACT (2003); Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, A 
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (1989). For a description of the way that trust can play a role in 
assuring cooperation in recovery, see ANNETTE C. BAIER, Trust and Its Vulnerabilities, in 
MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 130, 138-39 (1994). 
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i. the present limitations of contract law  
A. Underenforcement and Contract Duties To Cooperate in Recovery 
I begin with a more precise description of the category of contract terms 
under discussion. These are terms that attempt to address underenforcement—
the fact that many harmful breaches do not give rise to a remedy or equivalent 
settlement. The causes of underenforcement are manifold and familiar. 
Litigation costs are in some cases so high that it is not worth the bother to sue. 
When the parties are in a valuable ongoing relationship, the nonbreaching 
party may choose to forgo a lawsuit to secure future deals. Defendants are 
sometimes judgment proof. And most important for my purposes, when the 
nonbreaching party does sue, insufficient evidence, limited or unbalanced 
litigation resources, and court or jury error can conspire to prevent proof of 
breach. 
The threat of underenforcement can be an obstacle to working out 
mutually acceptable terms. Parties enter into a contract when they believe its 
benefits outweigh its costs. A contract’s benefits include the opportunity to 
recover damages in the case of breach. The value of that benefit depends on the 
probability of enforcement, or the likelihood that the promisee will recover 
when she has a meritorious breach of contract suit. When in the course of 
negotiations party B balks because she is worried about underenforcement, and 
party A wants to make the deal happen, A must find a way to sweeten the pot. 
A often has a number of options to choose from and will presumably pick the 
one that provides B the greatest additional benefit at the least cost to himself. 
Thus if the transaction is a simple sale of goods, seller A might offer 
concessions in the price or quantity term, additional assurances that he will 
deliver conforming goods on time, or a higher damage measure. If buyer B is 
particularly worried about underenforcement, A’s cheapest option might be an 
additional term designed to promote B’s ability to recover should A breach. 
Several categories of contract provisions fit this description. Some contracts 
put the payment of damages out of the control of the breaching promisor and 
into the hands of the disappointed promisee or a third party. Examples include 
security deposits, installment payments, funds held in escrow, and 
performance bonds.14 The parties can also contract into alternative adjudicative 
procedures that they believe will increase the likelihood of recovery. Choice of 
 
14.  For a helpful overview of such mechanisms, albeit with an emphasis more on securing ex 
ante reliability rather than ex post compensation, see Ronald J. Mann, Verification 
Institutions in Financial Transactions, 87 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1999). 
0002.KLASS 10/25/2007  11:02 AM 
contracting for cooperation in recovery 
11 
 
forum and choice of law clauses can be used to opt into more plaintiff-friendly 
or less costly legal regimes. Similarly, mediation and arbitration provisions can 
increase the probability of enforcement through specialization (the use of 
expert adjudicators) and cost savings (lower litigation costs). This second 
category also includes procedural tinkering like specialized discovery 
procedures or nonstandard burdens of proof.15 
This Article examines a third category: contractual duties to cooperate in, 
or not obstruct, the promisee’s recovery of damages due her. Obstruction 
comes in a variety of flavors. Most obvious is outright dissimulation. Promisors 
attempt to hide breach, they try to prevent or delay lawsuits with false 
assurances that performance will happen, they lie in court. But not all 
obstruction involves misrepresentation. A promisor might destroy records or 
other evidence of his nonperformance, transfer or manipulate assets to make 
himself judgment proof, or raise frivolous defenses and employ other delaying 
tactics in the course of litigation. Finally, my broad definition of “obstruct” is 
meant also to capture sins of omission where there is a duty to assist in 
recovery. These can include a promisor’s decision not to inform the promisee 
of breach, his failure to keep records that would show nonperformance, his 
refusal to voluntarily pay damages obviously due, or his noncooperation in 
judicial proceedings. Each of these tactics decreases the likelihood that a 
meritorious breach-of-contract suit will succeed—both directly, by affecting 
legal processes, and indirectly, by increasing the costs of litigation. 
Some obstructive behavior is subject to mandatory legal penalties. If a 
defendant gives false testimony about the existence of a contract, its content, or 
his performance, he commits perjury and risks criminal or civil sanctions. A 
promisor who, after nonperformance but before a lawsuit, lies about his intent 
to cure might be held liable for fraud.16 Litigation tactics that fall short of 
misrepresentation can violate provisions like Rule 11, which permits a court to 
sanction pleadings that are “presented for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation.”17 Finally, discovery rules, which are again backed by deterrence 
 
15.  For the parties’ ability to modify discovery procedures, see FED. R. CIV. P. 29. For the 
possible use of alternative burdens of proof, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 856-78. 
16.  AYRES & KLASS, supra note 6, at 165-68. This statement must be qualified by the already-
noted reluctance of some courts to permit actions for fraud in the contractual setting. See 
infra Section III.B. 
17.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.7 (West 2006); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 
137; N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8 (West 2007); TEX. R. CIV. PROC. ANN. 13 (Vernon 2003). But see Chris 
William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 1384-86 (2006) (observing 
the limited scope of criminal and procedural sanctions for detection avoidance). 
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sanctions, impose affirmative duties to provide information the other side can 
use to show nonperformance. 
The point of each of these mechanisms is to prevent defendants from 
obstructing plaintiffs’ recovery of damages due. None, however, is specific to 
the contracts setting. Nor are most contractual in a more technical sense: they 
are not duties that the parties have contracted for, or could contract out of. 
Rather, they are mandatory or quasi-mandatory rules that apply in all cases, no 
matter what any contract between the parties says.18 
The question of this Article is what the parties can do when they want 
more. In circumstances where these mandatory and quasi-mandatory no-
obstruct rules provide insufficient protection, how might the parties 
supplement those rules with contractual duties to cooperate in recovery?19 In 
answering that question, I will focus on a subclass of no-obstruct duties: duties 
to create, preserve, or share information about performance and breach. 
Examples include terms that require the promisor to create or preserve records, 
to inform the promisee of noncompliance, or not to hide breach.20 Such duties 
make it easier to verify whether performance has happened and thereby 
increase the probability that the promisee will be able to prove any breach in 
court. In addition, such terms can reduce litigation costs (by reducing the cost 
of information to the promisee) and make performance more observable (by 
telling the promisee about it).21 The thesis of this Article is that the law should 
allow parties to contract for effective no-obstruct duties of this sort, and that in 
 
18.  A rule can be said to be “quasi-mandatory” when the parties have a limited ability to modify 
it, though not to contract out of it entirely. Thus Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and many state analogs allow the parties to stipulate to discovery procedures, 
though such stipulations are subject to court review to ensure no undue frustration of the 
administration of justice. See, e.g., Franklin v. White, 493 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. 1986); Garden 
State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963). 
19.  There is an analog to promisor duties to cooperate in recovery: promisee duties not to 
falsely allege breach. Many of the arguments below would apply equally to such duties, 
though I do not consider them as such. 
20.  Examples of noninformational duties to cooperate include requirements that the promisor 
keep funds available to pay any first-order damage award, that the promisor remain within 
the reach of a jurisdiction, or that the promisor voluntarily pay damages for clear breach. 
Many of my conclusions apply to these duties as well, though the details of the argument 
and the remedies required are different. For example, as Richard Craswell pointed out to 
me, a contractual liquidity requirement might be most effective if its breach triggered 
accelerated first-order remedies, such as the right to demand adequate assurance. 
21.  I follow here the convention of using “observability” to refer to the parties’ ability to detect 
some fact, and “verifiability” to refer to the ease with which that fact can be demonstrated in 
court. 
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order to do so, it must allow them to attach extracompensatory remedies to the 
breach of those duties. 
Damage multipliers are another familiar solution to underenforcement. 
Where a contractual duty to cooperate adds another layer of regulation to 
increase the probability of performance, a multiplier aims to increase the 
penalty to the point at which the promisor gets the right risk-adjusted 
incentives (compensation multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of 
enforcement). I will argue that effective duties to cooperate require an 
exception to the rules against penalties and punitive damages. But if we are 
going to make an exception to those rules, perhaps it should instead be to give 
parties the option of multiplying damages, a solution to underenforcement that 
is easier to adopt and to administer. For the moment I simply flag this 
objection, leaving its answer for Part IV, after I have developed a more detailed 
picture of what effective duties to cooperate would look like. But the basic 
answer can be stated now: damage multipliers are more costly than they first 
appear. In many cases, contracting for specific duties not to obstruct is the 
more efficient means of realizing the benefits of contractual liability. 
B. Compensatory Remedies 
The limitations of compensatory damages when it comes to deterring 
obstructive behavior are nicely illustrated by a memo that came to light in 
Alabama’s recent suit against Exxon for nonpayment of oil and gas royalties.22 
In the early 1980s, Alabama entered into twenty-two oil and gas leases with 
Exxon on terms that were unusually favorable to the state, in that they 
prohibited Exxon from deducting many of the usual costs from its royalty 
payments.23 As with most royalty contracts, the leases also required that Exxon 
provide royalty reports, documenting the basis for its payments.24 In 1999, 
Alabama sued Exxon for underpayment of royalties. The jury found that in 
1993 Exxon formulated a plan to take prohibited cost deductions.25 In a memo 
to a senior vice president, executives argued that Alabama’s “inexperienced 
regulatory staff and processes,” which were already engaged in a complicated 
audit of Shell Oil, were unlikely to detect the proposed underpayments.26 
 
22.  See Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., 859 So. 2d 1096 (Ala. 2002); 
Post-Judgment Order, Alabama v. Exxon Corp., No. 99-2368 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Mar. 29, 2004). 
23.  859 So. 2d at 1100; Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 9. 
24.  Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 21, 52-54. 
25.  Id. at 19-22. 
26.  Id. at 21. 
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Moreover, they argued, Exxon’s exposure if caught would be only the 
underpayment plus twelve percent annual interest.27 Exxon apparently 
concluded that falsely reporting royalties was “a no-lose proposition.”28 As the 
trial court explained: 
The downside associated with any detection of its underpayment was 
nonexistent from Exxon’s perspective: it was certain that the very most 
it would have to pay the State would be what it already owed, the 
amount of its underpayment. . . . [E]ven if the State sued and won, 
Exxon knew that its return on the monies it withheld would in any 
event substantially exceed the 12% simple interest penalty it might 
ultimately have to pay. Thus, Exxon’s scheme was tantamount, it 
thought, to a cost-free, risk-free option.29 
The familiar point here is this: where enforcement is imperfect, compensatory 
damages do not sufficiently deter breach, especially opportunistic breach. But 
there is a deeper lesson as well. Exxon breached not only its duty to pay 
royalties, but also the duty to provide accurate accountings. That reporting 
duty was presumably put in place to guard against, and ensure recovery for, 
any breach of the underlying duty to pay. While compensatory damages 
provided too little deterrent against underpayment, they provided no deterrent 
against false royalty reports. Alabama could show that the royalty reports were 
false only if it could also demonstrate underpayment. But if Alabama could 
show underpayment, it could recover for the first-order breach on that basis, 
and the false reports caused it no actual harm. In fact, Exxon’s defense team 
attempted to rely on just this logic, arguing that “although Exxon withheld tens 
of millions of dollars in royalties owed under the leases, the State suffered zero 
detriment [as a result of the false reports, because] the harm from its 
 
27.  Id. at 21-22. 
28.  Id. at 20. 
29.  Id. at 21 (citations omitted). A similar description of the same dynamic can be found in the 
legislative history of a California bill that would have penalized recording companies for 
underpaying and misreporting royalties. The bill’s sponsor, Senator Murray, explained: 
“[T]his bill addresses the core issue that has allowed record companies to under-report 
royalty earnings without any penalty. . . . Under the current structure, there is no 
disincentive or penalty if record companies do not properly account royalties to artists; 
therefore, bad behavior is rewarded.” Cal. Assem. Comm. on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, 
Tourism, and Internet Media, Bill Analysis, S. 1034, 2002-2003 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1-2 (Cal. 
2003) (as amended May 12, 2003) (statement of Sen. Murray), available at http://
info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1001-1050/sb_1034_cfa_20030630_102556_asm
_comm.html. 
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underpayments is now ‘fully compensated through the contract damages.’”30 
So long as recovery for breach of the reporting duty required a proof of actual 
harm, Exxon would be off the hook. 
The trial court escaped the dilemma by finding a substantial basis not only 
for compensatory breach of contract damages, but also for a punitive award 
based on Exxon’s fraud.31 (That decision is currently on appeal, and is awaiting 
a ruling by the Alabama Supreme Court.32) Part III discusses how this fraud 
solution can work. But before getting there, or even to contractual solutions, 
we need a more general understanding of the limitations of compensatory 
damages when it comes to securing effective duties to cooperate in recovery. 
That understanding has three components. The first is the catch-22 Exxon 
relied on: the proof structure of compensatory damages for obstructive breach 
is such that a plaintiff can prove actual harm only if she has not suffered it. The 
catch-22, however, only applies to the most obvious obstructive harm: the 
promisee’s inability to recover for first-order breach. It is also necessary to 
show that the problem is not solved by recovery for other losses, which include 
increased litigation costs, delayed recovery, and inability to mitigate. Finally, 
there is the possibility that liquidated damages are a solution. I conclude that 
so long as liquidated damages are subject to the rule against penalties, they do 
not solve the problem. 
1. The Catch-22 
A more detailed account of the catch-22 begins with a distinction between 
two types of obstructive behavior. Recall that in my artificial use of the term, 
obstruction includes both affirmative acts (such as misrepresentations about 
performance or the destruction of records) and failures to act (not informing 
the promisee that a breach has occurred or failing to keep records, where there 
is a duty to do one or the other). Cutting across this distinction between active 
and passive obstruction is a difference between how obstruction is proven in 
court. I will call obstruction “independent” if it can be demonstrated without 
first showing that there was a first-order breach. Other obstruction is 
 
30.  Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 32; see also Reis v. Peabody Coal Co., 997 S.W.2d 49, 
68, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting the fraud defendant’s argument that the plaintiff 
incurred no actual damages because plaintiff had already recovered for breach of the royalty 
contract in arbitration). 
31.  Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 19-37, 62. 
32.  Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Conservation & Natural Res., No. 1031167 (Ala. filed Apr. 30, 
2004). 
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“dependent,” which is to say capable of proof only by first showing breach of 
the underlying duty. 
An example will illustrate the difference and be useful in the analysis that 
follows. Suppose Developer is deciding whether to hire Contractor to install 
high-speed network wiring in a residential building she is constructing. 
Developer is concerned about underenforcement. In particular, she is worried 
that nonconforming work may be both unobservable, because Developer does 
not have the necessary expertise, and unverifiable, because the wiring will be 
built into the walls and it will not be worth tearing the building apart to prove 
breach. Contractor, aware of Developer’s concerns, suggests adding a 
recordkeeping clause, which will require Contractor to keep detailed records of 
materials and work performed. 
There are two relevant ways Contractor might breach the recordkeeping 
clause. First, he could fail to keep any of the required records. That breach 
would, in my terminology, be a form of independent obstruction, for Developer 
can show that Contractor did not keep the records whether or not she can show 
faulty installation. Other examples of independent obstruction include the 
refusal to allow audits, nonprovision of required performance reports, and 
destruction of evidence. Alternatively, Contractor might breach the 
recordkeeping clause by falsifying the required records to cover up the faulty 
installation. In order to demonstrate that obstructive breach, Developer would 
have to show that the records were false, that is, that the installation was in fact 
noncompliant. Falsifying records is generally a form of dependent obstruction, 
for its proof depends on a showing of first-order breach. Among the other 
varieties of dependent obstruction are not reporting a first-order breach, hiding 
it, and providing false performance reports. 
The distinction between independent and dependent obstruction marks a 
difference between types of obstructive behavior, not between no-obstruct 
duties. Thus breach of the recordkeeping clause is either independent or 
dependent, depending on the manner of noncompliance. The breach of some 
duties to cooperate, however, is necessarily dependent. Suppose Contractor 
agrees instead to a reporting clause, which requires that he immediately 
disclose any nonconforming work. That duty has noncompliant installation as 
its condition precedent. To prove obstructive breach—failure to report—
Developer must first prove satisfaction of the condition precedent, which is a 
first-order breach. 
With these distinctions in hand, I now turn to the functioning of 
unliquidated compensatory damages for the most salient harm of obstructive 
breach: the promisee’s inability to recover for first-order nonperformance. 
(The next Section will consider the effects of compensation for other harms.) 
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Consider the situation where Contractor has falsified required records, 
which is a dependent obstructive breach (proving the records false presupposes 
showing noncompliant installation). Either Developer has separate sufficient 
evidence of the first-order breach or she does not. If Developer has the 
evidence, she can prove that Contractor breached his duty to install. She can 
therefore recover for the first-order breach, and the falsified records have not 
caused her the relevant loss. If Developer cannot prove first-order breach, then 
(assuming Contractor breached the duty to install) Developer has been harmed 
by Contractor’s failure to keep accurate records. Such records would have 
demonstrated the noncompliant installation and permitted recovery for the 
first-order breach. But without proof of noncompliant installation, Developer 
cannot prove that the records are false—that is, she cannot prove obstructive 
breach. Either way, breach of the duty to cooperate in recovery costs 
Contractor nothing. 
The recordkeeping clause requires Contractor to take affirmative steps to 
assist Developer’s recovery for the first-order breach. But the result is the same 
for the dependent breach of no-obstruct duties that prohibit bad behavior. 
Thus suppose the parties adopt instead a no-conceal clause, requiring that 
Contractor not attempt to hide noncompliant installation. The duty not to 
conceal applies only if Contractor is in first-order breach, so breach of the no-
conceal clause is necessarily dependent. If Contractor is deciding whether or 
not to cover up his faulty work, the threat of compensatory damages will not 
affect his decision. Should his attempt to hide the first-order breach succeed, 
he will not be held liable for the obstructive breach; should it fail, Developer 
then has independent proof of the noncompliant installation, and the salient 
harm of obstructive breach did not occur. 
The general and inherent limitation of compensatory damages for 
dependent obstructive breach is this: if the promisee cannot demonstrate first-
order breach, she cannot prove the dependent obstructive breach and recovers 
nothing for the obstructive breach. If the promisee can demonstrate first-order 
breach, she can recover for the first-order breach on the basis of that 
demonstration alone. Because the obstructive breach has not caused her the 
salient harm, there is no loss to compensate, so again she recovers nothing for 
the obstructive breach. So long as the remedy is limited to compensatory 
damages, the duty to cooperate makes no practical difference. 
The same result holds for independent obstruction, though here the 
problem is not proof of the obstructive breach, but proof of proximate harm. 
Suppose Contractor breaches the recordkeeping clause not by falsifying 
records, but by failing to keep them. In that case, it may be easy for Developer 
to prove obstructive breach, in part because proof of no records does not 
depend on a showing of noncompliant installation. But to recover 
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compensatory damages, Developer must also be able to show that the 
obstructive breach harmed her. On the present assumptions, this means 
showing that Contractor’s failure to keep records prevented her recovery for a 
first-order breach. Again there are two possibilities. If, despite Contractor’s 
failure to keep records, Developer discovers and can prove nonconforming 
installation, Developer can recover for the first-order breach. In that case, 
Developer has not suffered the salient obstructive harm, and, so long as 
damages are limited to compensatory measures, there is no recovery. If 
Developer cannot prove nonconforming installation, then she cannot prove 
that but for the failure to keep records, she would have recovered for a first-
order breach. Again there is no recovery for the obstructive breach, now 
because she cannot show that the obstruction caused her the relevant loss. 
This second version of the catch-22 is even more general. To show the most 
salient harm of an obstructive breach, dependent or independent, the promisee 
must show that, but for the obstruction, she would have recovered for the first-
order breach. That is, she must prove that she has a meritorious claim for 
breach of the underlying duty. But this is precisely what she cannot do if the 
obstructive breach was successful. The result is a win-win situation for the 
promisor. If his obstructive breach succeeds (that is, the promisee cannot prove 
first-order breach), the promisee cannot prove proximate harm and so recovers 
nothing. If the obstructive breach is unsuccessful, the promisee can prove first-
order breach and so suffers no compensable loss. Once again, there is no 
possible world in which compensatory damages for the obstructive breach 
make a practical difference. 
2. Other Losses: Avoidable Harms, Delayed Recovery, 
and Litigation Costs 
The catch-22 I have identified applies to unliquidated compensatory 
damages for the most salient and potentially costly harm of obstructive breach: 
the promisee’s inability to recover for first-order breach. But obstruction not 
only decreases the chance of first-order recovery, it also increases its cost. The 
promisee will have to spend more to discover and prove first-order breach, and 
recovery may be delayed, costing the promisee the earlier use of the funds. And 
obstruction can make first-order breach not only more difficult to verify (by a 
legal factfinder), but also to observe (by the promisee), preventing her from 
taking early actions to avoid loss. Increased litigation costs, delayed recovery, 
and the inability to mitigate do not redound to the benefit of the promisor. 
Forcing him to internalize those secondary costs of his obstructive breach 
might therefore tip the scales against the benefit he expects to receive from 
avoiding liability, thereby deterring obstructive breach. If compensation for the 
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most salient harm of obstructive breach, inability to recover, makes no practical 
difference, compensation for its secondary harms might. 
Parties need not add no-obstruct terms to their contract to recover for the 
secondary harms of obstruction. Fee-shifting and prejudgment interest clauses 
make the promisor found to have breached liable for all of the promisee’s 
litigation and delay costs. And the mitigation rule (“a party cannot recover 
damages for loss that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts”33) forces the 
promisor to internalize the costs of withholding information about breach: the 
longer the promisee remains in the dark, the longer she will be unable to take 
reasonable efforts to avoid losses, and the greater the promisor’s liability. 
My analysis of the parties’ interest in securing incentives against 
obstruction of recovery casts new light on these familiar mechanisms. 
Proponents of fee shifting, for instance, often emphasize its value as a deterrent 
to frivolous lawsuits.34 Less commonly noticed is the flip-side: fee shifting also 
deters obstruction, since the more the defendant obstructs recovery, the greater 
the plaintiff’s litigation costs, which the defendant will have to pay if he loses. 
Similar arguments apply to prejudgment interest awards and the mitigation 
rule. In addition to their other benefits, these mechanisms encourage 
cooperation in recovery. 
In fact, such mechanisms have an important advantage over more narrowly 
tailored no-obstruct terms. Contractually specified duties not to obstruct 
function only if the parties can identify, at the time of formation, specific 
behaviors likely to affect the probability of recovery. Fee shifting, prejudgment 
interest, and the mitigation rule, on the other hand, capture all obstructive 
behavior, whether identified in advance or not. 
 
33.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (1981). 
34.  Discouraging frivolous lawsuits is but one of the claimed advantages of fee shifting. See, e.g., 
W. Kent Davis, The International View of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the United States 
the “Odd Man Out” in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 361, 399-430 
(1999) (arguing that fee shifting can reduce the number of lawsuits and ensure access to 
litigation); Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous 
Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a Repeated Play Game, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147 (1998) 
(finding that fee shifting can reduce frivolous litigation costs, where lawyer reputation is 
relevant); James W. Hughes & Edward A. Snyder, Litigation and Settlement Under the English 
and American Rules: Theory and Evidence, 38 J.L. & ECON. 225 (1995) (finding that efficient 
settlement, costs, and successful plaintiff suits are more common under the English rule); 
Walter Olson & David Bernstein, Loser-Pays: Where Next?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1161, 1161-63 
(1996) (arguing that fee shifting can diminish speculative lawsuits, can decrease litigation 
costs, and is more fair); John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The 
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1590-93 (1993) (describing common 
arguments against the American rule). 
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There are therefore two relevant questions. First, do compensatory 
damages for the breach of tailored no-obstruct terms add anything to these 
existing mechanisms? Second, can compensation for the secondary harms of 
obstruction—whether in the form of compensatory damages for obstructive 
breach or pursuant to more familiar means—provide the promisee sufficient 
protection against obstructive behavior? 
The one place where tailored no-obstruct duties provide a clear advantage 
over other modes of recovery is the extra litigation expenses caused by 
independent obstructive breach.35 Fee-shifting clauses typically provide for the 
recovery of attorneys’ fees and other costs only if the promisee can show first-
order breach. But a promisee might prove an independent obstructive breach 
even if she cannot prove the first-order breach. If she can recover litigation 
costs solely because of the obstructive breach, the no-obstruct term provides 
greater protection than a fee-shifting clause. Thus suppose Contractor has 
failed to keep any of the records required by the recordkeeping clause. That 
obstructive breach will increase Developer’s recovery costs—Developer has to 
invest more to confirm Contractor’s performance, or to discover and prove 
noncompliant installation. While a fee-shifting clause allows Developer to 
recover these costs only if she proves first-order breach, compensatory damages 
for the obstructive breach should mean Developer recovers them whether or 
not she can show noncompliant installation.36 Because proof of no records is 
independent of and more likely than proof of the underlying breach, litigation 
 
35.  The plausibility of recovery of attorney fees for obstructive breach is demonstrated by some 
contemporary reactions to California’s experiment with punitive damages for obstruction of 
recovery in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984). 
See C. Delos Putz, Jr., & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attorney Fees—Not Tort 
Liability—Is the Remedy for “Stonewalling,” 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 499 (1987); Dana Rae 
Landsdorf, Note, California’s Detortification of Contract Law: Is the Seaman’s Tort Dead?, 26 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 213, 238 (1992) (“Contracting parties who deny—in bad faith—the 
existence of a contract should be liable for all damages proximately caused and resulting 
from such conduct. For example, the breaching party should not only be liable for 
compensatory damages but also for the injured party’s attorney’s fees because the non-
breaching party does not expect to incur attorney’s fees from the transaction.”). 
36.  It might be thought that no court would award litigation costs without proof of first-order 
breach, the idea being that such recovery would give promisees a perverse incentive to sue. 
That thought overlooks the fact that compensatory litigation-cost damages for breach of an 
anti-obstruction clause should be limited to costs attributable to the defendant’s obstructive 
behavior. Litigation-cost recovery for breach of the recordkeeping clause would not give 
Developer a free suit on the first-order breach. It would, however, support her expenditure 
of extra resources to determine whether there was a first-order breach—expenses that would 
be unnecessary but for Contractor’s failure to keep the required records. Developer should 
be permitted to recover these costs whether or not she sues for the underlying breach, and if 
she does sue on the underlying breach, whether or not she prevails in that suit. 
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cost recovery for the obstructive breach provides greater assurances against that 
form of obstruction than a simple fee-shifting provision would. 
Compensation for the other secondary harms of obstructive breach—delay 
in recovery and inability to mitigate—is in all cases more effectively 
accomplished using prejudgment interest clauses or the mitigation rule, 
regardless of whether the obstruction in question is dependent or independent. 
Compensation for delayed recovery presupposes proof that recovery was 
warranted, which is to say, a showing of first-order breach. Thus delayed-
recovery damages for obstructive breach provide no greater protection than a 
simple prejudgment interest clause, which compensates for all delays upon 
proof of first-order breach. Recovery for losses that could have been avoided 
but for the obstructive breach similarly presupposes proof that those losses are 
attributable to first-order breach. If the promisee can show first-order breach, 
the mitigation rule already permits recovery for those losses, since ex hypothesi 
they were not avoidable. A similar argument applies to litigation costs resulting 
from dependent obstructive breach. 
This answers the first question: compensatory damages for the secondary 
harms of obstructive breach provide at best only slightly more protection 
(litigation costs for independent obstructive breach) against obstruction than 
more familiar and broadly effective mechanisms like fee shifting, prejudgment 
interest, and the mitigation rule. The remaining question is this: How much 
protection does liability for these secondary harms, whether based on specific 
no-obstruct terms or on the generic mechanisms, provide? Is liability a 
sufficient deterrent against obstruction to protect the promisee against 
obstruction’s more salient harm—the inability to recover for first-order breach? 
Common sense, and examples like Exxon’s relative indifference to the 
twelve percent interest charge on unpaid royalties,37 suggest that the answer is 
often “no.” Forcing the promisor to internalize the costs to the promisee of 
delayed recovery, more complex litigation, and the inability to mitigate is not 
enough. In many cases, these costs of obstruction will be outweighed by the 
potential payoff: avoiding first-order liability. This commonsense judgment is 
based on three facts. First, because the promisor generally pays for the 
secondary harms of obstruction only if the promisee can show first-order 
breach (the only exception being litigation costs for independent obstructive 
breach), he discounts those costs by the chance of no first-order liability, an 
eventuality that obstruction makes all the more likely. As a result, the promisor 
internalizes a diminished portion of secondary costs of his obstructive tactics. 
Second, should the promisor be held liable, the added cost of his obstructive 
 
37.  See supra text accompanying note 29. 
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behavior will not be all of the promisee’s secondary costs, but only those 
attributable to the obstruction. For instance, litigation-cost recovery does not 
force the promisor to pay for all of the promisee’s attorney fees, but only for 
fees caused by the promisor’s obstructive behavior. These figures are likely to 
be orders of magnitude less than the damages for the underlying breach that 
the promisor might hope to avoid. Finally, the potential upside of 
obstruction—the increased chance that the plaintiff will not recover and the 
defendant will not have to pay anything—can be very large. This is so when the 
remedy for the underlying breach is costly or there is a high probability that the 
obstruction will succeed. The latter case is particularly relevant, since effective 
obstruction both lowers the likelihood that the promisor will have to pay for its 
secondary harms (the first point above) and means a big gain in terms of 
avoiding first-order liability. In a great many cases, therefore, compensatory 
damages for the secondary harms of obstructive breach provide insufficient 
protection against obstruction’s primary harm, no recovery for first-order 
breach. 
3. Liquidated Damages for Obstructive Breach 
The conclusion so far: unliquidated compensatory damages for obstructive 
breach will, in many cases, do little or nothing to deter the promisor who 
would otherwise obstruct recovery. The primary reason for this is the catch-22 
embedded in the proof of harmful obstructive breach. To prove the most 
significant harm of the breach (that the obstruction prevented recovery), and 
sometimes even to prove that there was a breach (in the case of dependent 
obstruction), the promisee must be able to show a first-order breach; but if she 
can do that, she can recover on the basis of that showing alone, and the 
obstructive breach did not cause her that harm. While recovery for secondary 
harms (increased litigation costs, delayed recovery, inability to mitigate) 
provides some measure of deterrence, we can predict that in many cases it will 
not be enough to assure a promisee who is worried that the promisor will not 
cooperate in recovery. 
Liquidated damages relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving harm. 
Given that the catch-22 turns in part on the promisee’s ability to prove actual 
loss, it is natural to ask whether a liquidated damages clause cannot resolve it. 
Closer examination will show that, like recovery for secondary harms, 
liquidated damages can provide some additional protection. But contractually 
specified damage amounts are limited by the compensation principle, in the 
form of the rule against penalties. As a result, liquidated damages cannot do 
the whole job. (Section III.C shows that penalties can be effective against 
obstruction.) 
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To analyze how compensatory liquidated damages for obstructive breach 
might work, let me return to Contractor’s agreement with Developer to install 
network wiring. Assume now that their contract liquidates damages for first-
order breach at $10,000, which represents the parties’ reasonable estimate of 
the replacement cost for defective wiring. Suppose further that the contract 
includes the recordkeeping clause, and that Developer and Contractor want to 
liquidate damages for its breach as well. 
The rule against penalties requires that damages be liquidated “at an 
amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss,” and 
states that a “term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is 
unenforceable . . . as a penalty.”38 So, in seeking out an enforceable liquidated 
damage amount, the parties must predict what breach of the recordkeeping 
clause is likely to cost Developer. Putting aside the secondary harms discussed 
in the previous section (which often pale in comparison to the inability to 
recover for first-order breach), breach of the recordkeeping clause will harm 
Developer only if two conditions are met: Contractor has breached the 
agreement to install, and the missing or false records prevent Developer from 
proving first-order breach. If both conditions are satisfied, Contractor’s 
obstructive breach costs Developer $10,000—the amount she would have 
recovered in liquidated damages had she been able to show noncompliant 
installation. If either condition is not satisfied—if Contractor has performed 
the installation correctly, or if Developer can prove noncompliant installation 
despite the missing or falsified records—the obstructive breach costs Developer 
nothing. 
So, at what amount should the parties liquidate damages? If an obstructive 
breach causes Developer a significant harm, it will be in the amount of 
$10,000—the first-order liquidated damages amount. But it is hard to imagine 
a situation in which a court would award $10,000 for the faulty records. If 
Developer can show improper installation despite the obstructive breach, she 
can already recover $10,000 in first-order damages, and the $10,000 in 
liquidated damages for obstructive breach would mean double recovery. If 
Developer cannot show improper installation, the court is likely to balk at so 
large an award where there is proof of nothing more than faulty recordkeeping. 
To satisfy the compensation principle, Developer and Contractor will 
therefore choose some lower amount, say $1,000, and stipulate that it 
represents the cost to Developer of the decreased chance of proving first-order 
breach—in mathematical terms, the expected percentage-point decrease in 
probability of enforcement, multiplied by the value of a first-order damage 
 
38.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (2006). 
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award. Now suppose Developer can prove breach of the recordkeeping clause, 
say by showing that Contractor failed to keep any records, though she cannot 
prove noncompliant installation. A court might still enforce the $1,000 in 
liquidated damages, reasoning that the $1,000 amount is a reasonable risk-
adjusted forecast of damages and allowing for the possibility that there is an 
unverified first-order breach. The $1,000 liquidated damages amount will 
protect Developer against obstructive breach, however, only if it correctly 
captures the effect of improper recordkeeping. If failure to keep the required 
records decreases the probability of enforcement by ten percentage points or 
less, the $1,000 liquidated damages amount is enough.39 But if the obstruction 
is more effective, liquidated damages will have to be increased. And the greater 
the liquidated damage amount, the less likely the court is to enforce it where 
the promisee cannot show any actual loss. If no records will result in, for 
example, a fifty percentage-point decrease in the likelihood of enforcement, 
liquidated damages will have to be at least $5,00040—an amount that begins to 
look like a penalty for what, as far as the court knows, may be no more than a 
bookkeeping error. 
The underlying problem is that courts find it difficult to assess the 
reasonableness of damages where the very existence of a loss (not just its 
amount) depends on nonverifiable facts—in this case, whether or not there was 
a first-order breach. As a result, liquidated damages must be reduced to take 
account of the possibility, in the court’s mind, of first-order performance. But 
the promisor deciding whether to obstruct recovery is likely to know whether 
there has been or will be a first-order breach. And this means that the reduced 
liquidated damage amount will not be enough to convince him to cooperate in 
recovery. 
This is not to say that liquidated damages are not an improvement in cases 
where the promisee cannot show first-order breach. Where unliquidated 
compensatory damages result in no recovery (the catch-22 of proving 
damages), liquidated damages can impose some cost on and provide some 
insurance against obstructive breach. Nonetheless, the penalty rule will tend to 
push enforceable damage amounts below what is needed to fully deter or 
insure against obstruction. 
The last hypothetical, however, describes a situation where the promisee 
cannot prove first-order breach but can show obstructive breach, which is 
possible only where the obstruction is independent (such as failure to keep 
records). What about where the promisee can demonstrate both? 
 
39.  $1,000 = (.1)($10,000). 
40.  $5,000 = (.5)($10,000). 
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Many courts follow the Second Restatement rule that “[i]f . . . it is clear 
that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum as damages 
is unenforceable.”41 The reasoning is this: if it is certain that the promisee has 
suffered no loss, liquidated damages fail their essential purpose, for the amount 
of actual loss is not difficult to prove.42 Now suppose Developer can prove that 
Contractor failed to keep the records required by the recordkeeping clause, but 
she can also show noncompliant installation. If the court follows the Second 
Restatement, Contractor has a good argument against any liquidated damages 
award for his obstructive breach. Proof of noncompliant installation entitles 
Developer to the $10,000 first-order liquidated damages amount, from which 
it follows that the obstructive breach did not significantly harm her. 
This last dynamic is fatal when it comes to dependent obstructive breach—
where proof of obstruction requires first showing a first-order breach. If an 
obstructive breach is dependent, the plaintiff can show obstructive breach only 
when the defendant can show that that breach did not cause the plaintiff a 
significant loss. In jurisdictions that follow the Second Restatement rule, 
liquidated damages for dependent obstructive breach should never be 
enforceable. Any liquidated damage award for obstruction—be it $1,000, $100, 
or $10—is a pure penalty. 
This may even be the case in jurisdictions that do not follow the no-loss, 
no-liquidation rule, though the small number of decisions makes it difficult to 
be certain. Williston suggests that whether a court will award liquidated 
damages where there is proof of no loss depends on the extent to which the 
jurisdiction considers actual losses (as opposed to anticipated losses) in 
evaluating the reasonableness of the liquidated damages amount.43 But in the 
case of dependent obstructive breach (and recall that the breach of some no-
obstruct terms is always dependent), we get the same result whether 
reasonableness is evaluated ex ante or ex post. Unlike other sorts of breach, we 
can say in advance that if a plaintiff can prove dependent obstructive breach, 
the defendant will be able to show no significant loss. Even from the ex ante 
perspective, liquidated damages for dependent obstruction will be available 
only where the amount of loss is certain—namely, where it is demonstrably 
zero. Liquidated damages for dependent obstructive breach violate both the 
 
41.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. b (2006); see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 814-15 (4th ed. 2004). 
42.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 illus. 4 (2006); see also id. § 356(1) 
(“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an 
amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach 
and the difficulties of proof of loss.” (emphasis added)). 
43.  24 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 65:33 (4th ed. 2006). 
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rule against penalties and the rule that damages may only be liquidated when 
actual loss is difficult to prove. 
The above observations about when courts are likely to enforce liquidated 
damages attached to duties to cooperate are based not on decisions considering 
such terms, but on the rules that govern liquidated damages generally. It might 
well be that, if presented with the above arguments, a court might relax the 
rules against penalties and proof of actual loss so as to allow the recovery of 
higher liquidated damages for obstructive breach. Such an outcome, however, 
would also mean a retreat from the compensation principle, confirming the 
broader thesis of this Part. 
 
*          *          * 
 
The above analysis has shown how the compensation principle 
systematically pushes damage amounts below the level necessary fully to deter 
or insure against obstructive breach. The core cause is the catch-22 that inheres 
in proof of actual loss. Obstruction harms the promisee first and foremost by 
decreasing the probability of first-order recovery. But a plaintiff who can prove 
that harm has not suffered it: to demonstrate the harm, the plaintiff must show 
that but for the defendant’s obstruction, she would have recovered for first-
order breach; if she can prove that, she can recover on that basis alone, and the 
obstructive breach did not cause her the harm. The proof structure that gives 
rise to the catch-22 infects other modes of compensation as well. Recovery for 
the secondary harms of obstructive breach—additional litigation costs, delayed 
recovery, and otherwise avoidable losses—provide some measure of deterrence. 
But in many cases it will not be enough to dissuade a promisor who would 
otherwise choose to obstruct recovery, in part because recovery for secondary 
harms often depends on proof of first-order breach—proof that obstruction 
makes all the less likely. Liquidated damages, too, can partly avoid the catch-22. 
But the rule against penalties significantly diminishes their utility. Where there 
is no proof of first-order breach, liquidated damages for obstruction can appear 
unduly harsh, and where there is such proof, liquidated damages create double 
recovery and violate the no-loss, no-liquidation rule. 
It would be wrong to draw too strong a conclusion. Recovery for secondary 
harms and liquidating damages can provide some protection against 
obstruction. And for some parties that is enough. This could be so because the 
cost of liability for secondary harms or the enforceable liquidated damages 
amount is greater than the promisor’s expected gains from obstructing 
recovery (where, for example, obstruction has a low probability of success). It 
could also be so where there are other, nonlegal reasons not to obstruct. In 
relational contracts the threat of no future dealings might alone be enough to 
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ensure cooperation. And in industries that are highly organized or composed of 
repeat players, reputational or other nonlegal sanctions can deter obstructive 
behavior. But where there is a significant threat of obstruction and these 
extralegal protections are not available, the parties are likely to want more than 
contract law presently provides them. 
ii.  extracompensatory contract remedies 
The analysis in Part I has shown that, in many cases, effective duties not to 
obstruct require extracompensatory remedies. A contract remedy is 
extracompensatory if its application is not tied to the magnitude of harm 
caused. The extralegal sanctions mentioned above—no future dealings and loss 
of reputation—are extracompensatory in just this sense. (The reputational 
costs of obstructing recovery, for instance, might be much greater than the 
promisee’s losses.) This Part describes three sorts of extracompensatory legal 
remedies the parties might apply to obstructive breach.44 The first is 
termination of the contract, which is effective only when the promisor has not 
yet realized the contract’s entire value, and then only when the promisee does 
not already have the right to terminate. The second is a contractually specified 
adverse inference, where the parties stipulate that proof of obstruction shall tip 
the evidentiary scales for a showing of first-order breach. Adverse inferences 
can be effective against independent obstructive breach, but for obvious 
 
44.  Specific performance also qualifies as extracompensatory under my definition, but timing 
issues prevent it from being effective against most sorts of obstruction. An injunction 
ordering subsequent performance cannot undo the damage caused by destroyed records, 
hidden or unreported first-order nonperformance, delay tactics, and most other forms of 
obstruction. 
  One exception is contractual duties to permit audits. Thus 10 U.S.C. § 2313 (2000), 
which gives the Department of Defense the right to audit records of certain contractors, also 
gives it the power, enforceable by the district court, to subpoena those records. This is 
equivalent to a mandatory audit term supported by specific performance. California has 
recently legislated mandatory auditing rights in recording contracts, though without 
specifying the remedy for their breach. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2501 (West Supp. 2007). At some 
point the California courts will have to decide what the appropriate remedy is. My analysis 
suggests that it should be specific performance, an adverse inference, or some other 
extracompensatory measure. 
Yet other remedial options are available where the promisor is a corporate entity and 
liability for first-order and obstructive breaches (or rewards for cooperation) can be 
assigned separately to the corporation and its agents. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). Such a solution is comparable to putting enforcement in the 
hands of a third party. See supra text accompanying note 14.  
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reasons will make no difference where proof of obstruction presupposes proof 
of first-order breach. The third category of legal sanctions is penalties and 
punitive damages, which, I will argue, are the only generally effective contract 
remedies against obstructive breach. 
A. The Right To Terminate 
In some cases, it can be enough if an obstructive breach gives rise to the 
right to terminate, or rescind, the agreement.45 The termination remedy is 
extracompensatory, since it does not vary with or depend on the magnitude of 
the obstructive harm. Where the promisor values the promisee’s continued 
performance more than the potential benefit of obstructing recovery, 
termination can be effective. This is confirmed by evidence from the recording 
industry. Recording contracts are usually drafted by and often favor record 
labels. And while they typically require royalty accounting statements and give 
the artist a right to audit (duties to cooperate), they often stipulate that a 
breach of those duties shall not be material.46 If one believes artists’ claims that 
labels systematically underreport royalties and obstruct audits, the explanation 
for the latter provision is obvious.47 A material breach gives the nonbreaching 
party the right to terminate,48 and a termination remedy would deter labels 
from breaching these duties to cooperate—good from the perspective of 
 
45.  I will follow Farnsworth and use “terminate” (where one could also say “rescind” or 
“cancel”) to refer to the nonbreaching party’s right to end the contract. See FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 41, § 8.15 n.2. 
46.  According to California Senator Murray, a former entertainment lawyer, 
even though the obligation to accurately account for royalty earnings is a material 
part of the contract, most if not all recording artist contracts provide that a breach 
of the obligation to account for or pay royalties is not a material breach, leaving 
the artist with no real recourse except to settle the claim on perhaps a percentage 
of what is owed or else conduct protracted and expensive litigation at the possible 
expense of the artist’s career. 
Cal. Assem. Comm. on Arts, Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, Bill 
Analysis, S. 1034, 2002-2003 Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1-2 (Cal. 2003) (third reading) 
(paraphrasing Sen. Murray), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1001-
1050/sb_1034_cfa_20030514_100846_sen_floor.html. 
47.  For the power of labels to dictate terms, and how this plays out in terms of artists’ ability to 
get accurate accountings or otherwise monitor label performance, see Wendy V. 
Bartholomew, Fiduciary Duty: Can It Help Calm the Fears of Underpaid Artists?, 6 VAND. J. 
ENT. L. & PRAC. 246 (2004); and Corrina Cree Clover, Note, Accounting Accountability: 
Should Record Labels Have a Fiduciary Duty To Report Accurate Royalties to Recording Artists?, 
23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 395 (2003). 
48.  FARNSWORTH, supra note 41, § 8.16. 
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enforcement, but bad from the point of view of the drafter and dominant party 
in the transaction. 
Richard Craswell provides a general description of how the right to 
terminate can provide a form of property-rule protection against certain 
contractual wrongs. His primary concern is how the law can prevent duress, 
fraud and other acts that interfere with consent, but the basic point applies 
more broadly. 
One way to [deter bad acts] is to not enforce any obligation whatsoever 
on behalf of any X who has failed to obtain Y’s proper consent. For 
example, if X forces Y to purchase her goods at gunpoint, the court can 
allow Y to rescind the contract entirely. This outcome may deter X from 
using duress because it denies X any profit from her dealings with Y, 
unless she properly obtains Y’s consent.49 
The same holds true for obstructive breach. Where the promisor values the 
continued existence of the contract more than he expects to gain from 
obstructing recovery, and where the obstructive breach is likely to be detected 
and demonstrated and will give the promisee the right to terminate, the 
promisor will choose to cooperate in recovery. That is, a termination remedy 
will be most effective where the obstructive breach is easily observed and 
verified (such as refusal to permit an audit) and the promisor expects to 
continue extracting value from the contract (as in long-term recording 
agreements). 
These conditions are not always satisfied. Most obviously, if the transaction 
is a one-time deal and the promisee’s first-order performance is before the 
promisor’s, the termination remedy is no disincentive against obstructive 
breach. More generally, the effectiveness of the termination remedy will 
depend on the contract’s remaining unrealized value to the promisor, the 
likelihood that his obstructive breach will be discovered and proven, the cost of 
the first-order liability he wishes to avoid, and so on. Termination is, in 
Craswell’s terms, the “minimum sanction”—in some cases a “penalty heavier 
than mere nonenforcement is needed.”50 
There is, however, another aspect of the termination remedy that is specific 
to duties to cooperate. Where the promisee has separate proof of a material 
first-order breach, she might already have a right to terminate. A contract can 
be cancelled only once, so in such cases a termination right for obstruction is 
 
49.  Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7 (1993). 
50.  Id. at 7-8 (emphasis omitted). 
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redundant. In some cases it is much easier to show obstructive breach than it is 
to show first-order breach—proof of a record company’s refusal to permit 
audits as compared to proof of underpayment. But this is not always so, and 
the more likely separate proof of first-order material breach, the more diluted 
the effect of the right to terminate for obstruction. And because proof of 
dependent obstruction always requires separate proof of first-order breach, the 
termination remedy for obstructive breach is worth nothing. The catch-22 
replicates itself here, now in the form of redundant remedies. 
B. Adverse Inferences 
If the point of obstruction is to prevent proof of first-order breach, one 
obvious remedy for obstructive breach is an adverse inference. Thus the parties 
might decide in advance that proof of obstructive breach shall have a certain 
evidentiary value with respect to first-order breach by agreeing to a conditional 
presumption, admission, or other burden-shifting device.51 Such a remedy is 
extracompensatory, since it does not depend on proof of actual harm. But 
rather than a monetary penalty, the deterrent is evidentiary. 
At present there is little law on when or to what extent parties can contract 
for atypical burdens of proof or standards of evidence that will govern the 
contract’s enforcement. Probably the most informed guess is that of Scott and 
Triantis, who report: “While we have not found direct authority, we believe 
that courts would enforce reasonable contractual burden of proof provisions. 
And, we have found ample evidence that many contracts in fact contain such 
provisions.”52 All of the contracts Scott and Triantis describe, however, 
unconditionally modify the otherwise applicable burden of proof or standard 
of evidence. None condition the change on a party’s bad behavior, such as the 
defendant’s attempt to obstruct recovery.53 
 
51.  For a description of how courts and prosecutors use adverse inferences to discourage 
obstruction in the criminal context, see Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 1378-82. 
52.  Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 857-58 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at 856-78 
(describing decisions). 
53.  Thus Scott and Triantis identify only three ways by which the parties might 
clarify, reverse, or fine-tune the default allocation in their contract. . . . The first 
approach is by direct allocation of burden; the second is by predesignating whom 
the plaintiff will be in the event of a dispute; and the third is by framing the 
substantive provisions governing, for example, the right to assign or terminate a 
contract. 
  Id. at 866. I am suggesting a fourth: rather than direct allocation of the burden, conditional 
allocation. Scott and Triantis do describe an instance in which the court determined that a 
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While there is little law in the area, courts would likely be sympathetic to 
such contract terms. The party-specified remedy—a change to the way breach 
is proven—is closely related to the wrong—obstruction of recovery. Moreover, 
one can find analogs elsewhere in the law. For example, the rules governing the 
destruction or spoliation of evidence provide for a presumption that the lost 
evidence was unfavorable to the party at fault.54 Equitable principles of 
estoppel might be applied to reach a similar result, the argument being that the 
defendant should not be permitted to benefit from obstructive behavior. 
The threat of an adverse inference will fully deter obstructive breach only 
when the inference increases the probability that the promisor will pay 
damages for the underlying breach more than the obstruction reduces that 
probability. The former depends on two factors: first, the probability that the 
promisee will be able to show an obstructive breach in circumstances where she 
would not otherwise (absent the adverse inference) be able to demonstrate 
first-order breach; second, the strength of the inference—whether the 
obstruction is to be conclusive evidence of a first-order breach, to shift the 
burden of proof, or simply to be placed on the scales with everything else. An 
adverse inference is most likely to work where it is easier to detect obstructive 
breach than it is first-order breach, and the inference is a strong one. 
As an example, recall the hypothetical recordkeeping clause. Contractor’s 
failure to keep the required records is easy to detect—much easier than 
noncompliant installation. Assume that the recordkeeping clause also specifies 
a strong adverse inference as its remedy: improper records shift the burden of 
proof, so Contractor must show compliant installation. Finally, recall my 
assumption that it is very difficult to prove breach or performance after the 
wiring is installed. Faced with the prospect of an adverse inference, Contractor 
may well choose to keep the required records. The benefit of hiding breach is 
not worth the increased chance that he will be found liable as a result of the 
adverse inference. 
The reader might object that, faced with the prospect of an adverse 
inference, Contractor would never breach in so obvious a way as failing to keep 
records. If he wants to avoid liability for noncompliant installation, he will 
 
prima facie showing of bad faith shifted the burden of proof—though not at the behest of 
the contract. Id. at 876-77 (discussing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Calvin, 353 So. 2d 144 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1977)). 
54.  See generally 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 244 (1944 & Supp. 2006). The evidentiary rule 
requires proof of scienter: “a conscious awareness of the existence of the dispute and that 
the act done will destroy evidence or access to evidence.” Id. This is interesting in light of my 
argument in Sections III.B and IV.A that scienter requirements add value to no-obstruct 
duties. 
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falsify the records, which is much more difficult to detect. This objection is 
correct and shows why adverse inferences are at best a partial solution. But the 
difference between not keeping records and keeping false records is not only a 
difference in the degree of observability or verifiability of each. 
An adverse inference works only if there are possible states of the world in 
which (a) the promisee cannot otherwise prove the first-order breach, (b) she 
can prove obstructive breach, and (c) the resulting adverse inference tips the 
balance with respect to proof of the first-order breach. Conditions (a) and (b) 
jointly entail that the obstructive breach is an independent one—that it is 
possible to prove the obstruction without first proving first-order breach. The 
adverse inference is ineffective against falsification of records not because of the 
low probability of detection or proof, but because that breach of the 
recordkeeping clause is a form of dependent obstruction. If Developer can 
show false records, she has already proven first-order breach, and the adverse 
inference makes no practical difference. The upshot is similar to the limitation 
of the termination remedy: while the threat of an adverse inference can deter 
some forms of independent obstruction—those that are easy to detect and 
verify, and where the adverse inference is likely to result in a finding of a first-
order breach—it is ineffective against dependent obstruction. 
C. Penalties and Punitive Damages: A New Argument 
The only generally effective contract remedy for obstructive breach is a 
penalty or punitive damages clause. To be able to contract for meaningful 
duties against the full range of obstructive behavior, parties must be able to 
attach either extracompensatory liquidated damages (penalties) or court- or 
jury-assessed extracompensatory money payments (punitive damages) to the 
breach. 
How large must a penalty or punitive damages be fully to deter obstructive 
breach? The answer is familiar: the lower limit is the promisor’s expected gain 
from breach multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability of enforcement.55 
The promisor’s expected gain from obstruction is the reduced chance that he 
will have to pay first-order damages. More specifically, and assuming that the 
promisor has breached his first-order duties, it is the percentage-point 
reduction in the probability of first-order enforcement multiplied by what 
first-order liability would cost the promisor. Thus if falsifying records 
decreases the probability of $10,000 in liability from eighty percent to thirty 
 
55.  See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 
421, 425-39 (1998). 
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percent, the fifty percentage-point reduction in the probability of first-order 
enforcement is worth $5,000 to the promisor.56 Deterrence requires the 
sanction be greater than that gain multiplied by the reciprocal of the 
probability that the sanction will be applied. To continue the example, if we 
assume there is a twenty percent chance that the promisee will discover and be 
able to prove false records, the standard punitive damage formula recommends 
a sanction greater than $25,000.57 
Penalties and punitive damages avoid both prongs of the catch-22. There is 
no double-recovery problem in cases where the plaintiff has independent proof 
of first-order breach, for penalties and punitive damages are not meant to 
compensate. They therefore work equally well against independent and 
dependent obstructive breach (despite the fact that proof of the latter 
presupposes proof of first-order breach). Where the plaintiff cannot prove 
first-order breach, and therefore cannot prove actual harm, the penalty or 
punitive damages should still be awarded, as the remedy is not meant to 
compensate actual loss.58 
At present, however, “[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach 
of contract,”59 and “[a] term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.”60 The above analysis 
 
56.  ($10,000)(.5) = $5,000. 
57.  ($5,000)/(.2) = $25,000. 
58.  In many jurisdictions, punitive damages may only be awarded where there is proof of actual 
loss. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 197 (2002) (“As a general rule, in order to recover exemplary or 
punitive damages, actual damages must be shown, or there must be a basis for the recovery 
of compensatory damages.” (footnote omitted)); 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. 
WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5:21 (2d ed. Supp. 2003) (“Abundant 
authority exists to support the proposition that a finding must be entered entitling the 
plaintiff to actual damages before that plaintiff will be allowed to recover punitive 
damages.”). This rule is open to criticism. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 
cmt. c (1979) (“Although . . . the extent of the harm may be considered in determining their 
amount, it is not essential to the recovery of punitive damages that the plaintiff should have 
suffered any harm, either pecuniary or physical.”); Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive 
Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 666-67 (1980) (arguing 
against the rule that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to actual harm). In 
jurisdictions that follow the first rule, the secondary harms of obstructive breach might 
satisfy the actual harm requirement. And the punitive damages in cases where there is proof 
of harm can be further increased to take account of the ex ante possibility that such proof 
was not going to be available. 
59.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981). For developments in the law of 
punitive damages for breach of contract, see William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive 
Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 636-51 (1999). 
60.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (1981). For descriptions of practical 
complexities and differences between jurisdictions, see Kenneth W. Clarkson, Roger LeRoy 
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provides a strong instrumentalist argument for making an exception to these 
rules for contractual duties not to obstruct.61 There are good reasons to think 
that, if given the option, most parties would not choose to attach penalties or 
punitive damages to first-order breach. Among other things, 
extracompensatory damages can interfere with efficient breach, reducing the 
overall value of the transaction.62 When it comes to obstructive breach, 
however, extracompensatory damages can be the only effective remedy—there 
is no more efficient compensatory or subcompensatory alternative. If the 
parties want duties to cooperate in recovery, they probably have a good reason 
to want to attach a penalty or punitive damages to the breach of those duties. 
I am not the first to recommend revising the existing mandatory rules 
against penalties and punitive damages. In fact, it is perhaps the majority 
opinion among efficiency theorists. But the above argument is new. To begin 
with, it does not depend on a commitment either to freedom of contract (the 
parties should be allowed to contract for whatever terms they wish) or to 
choice as the metric of value (if the parties choose it, it must be value-
creating).63 Nor does the argument rely on empirical assumptions about the 
 
Miller & Timothy J. Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978 WIS. L. 
REV. 351, 352-57; Ian R. Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 
495, 501-13 (1962); and Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and 
the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1200-05 (1994). 
61.  Not all states follow these rules. South Carolina, for example, permits punitive damages for 
breach of contract accompanied by “any act characterized by dishonesty in fact, unfair 
dealing, or the unlawful appropriation of another’s property by design,” a rule that might 
well cover many forms of obstructive behavior. Perry v. Green, 437 S.E.2d 150, 152 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1993); see also Dodge, supra note 59, at 649-50 (describing similar rules in Idaho, 
Mississippi, and New Mexico). It is unclear whether the courts in these states treat such 
punitive damages as mandatory remedies or as defaults the parties could opt out of, much 
less whether courts would permit the parties to specify the bad acts that should trigger 
them. 
62.  See infra text accompanying notes 123-128. 
63.  The argument from freedom of contract is suggested by Daniel Friedmann in The Efficient 
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (1989). Samuel Rea describes the difficulty the choice 
metric poses for economic explanations of the rule against penalties: 
The perplexing aspect of the penalties-liquidated damages distinction is that there 
is a conflict between the apparent, but express, intention of the parties and the 
subsequent action of the courts.  
Economists are inclined to believe that courts are contributing to inefficiency 
when they upset the agreed upon terms of a contract. 
Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 147, 148 (1984); see also Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289 
(7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.) (“[T]he parties (always assuming they are fully competent) will, 
in deciding whether to include a penalty clause in their contract, weigh the gains against the 
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capacity of the courts to distinguish penalties from reasonable estimates of 
harm.64 Finally, the argument does not correspond to any of the transaction 
structures (all involving informational asymmetries or verification problems) 
in which extracompensatory damages have been shown to create efficient 
investment incentives for first-order duties.65 Rather than identifying a 
category of transactions where extracompensatory measures are more efficient, 
the argument identifies a category of terms for which legal liability does not 
work unless the parties can choose penalties or punitive damages. 
There is also a practical difference. The basic insight behind the economic 
argument dates back at least to 1977.66 Yet in the thirty years since, it has had 
little or no influence on lawmakers. The mandatory rules against penalties and 
punitive damages appear as vibrant today as ever.67 The explanation might be 
 
costs . . . and will include the clause only if the benefits exceed those costs . . . .”); Charles J. 
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 
555 n.12 (1977) (describing how the penalty doctrine is “anomalous in terms of the 
theoretical underpinnings of modern contract law”). 
64.  Thus Alan Schwartz argues: 
Courts do not have to prevent promisees from obtaining penalty clauses if 
promisees do not want penalty clauses. The ex ante rule is not merely 
unnecessary: judicial review produces mischief. Courts sometimes mistake 
compensatory damage measures for penalties, and so have found that particular 
liquidated damage clauses would inevitably overcompensate promisees when 
those clauses only protected the expectation. Thus, the ex ante branch of the 
liquidated damage rule should be abandoned. 
Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supercompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of 
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 370 (1990); see also Goetz & Scott, supra 
note 63, at 578-93 (arguing that many penalty clauses are designed to compensate for 
damages or create efficient incentives that remain inscrutable to courts); Schwartz, supra, at 
383-87. 
65.  These developments are described in Edlin & Schwartz, supra note 4, at 43-52. 
66.  See Goetz & Scott, supra note 63, at 554. 
67.  See, e.g., Klinger v. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50, 130 P.3d 1027, 1034 (Colo. 2006) (“[A] 
contract provision for liquidated damages is invalid as a penalty if it is unreasonably large 
for the expected loss from a breach of contract.”); Bragdon v. Twenty-Five Twelve Assocs. 
P’ship, 856 A.2d 1165, 1173 (D.C. 2004) (“Punitive damages will not lie for breach of 
contract, even if it is proven that the breach was willful, wanton, or malicious.”); Dist. 
Cablevision P’ship v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714, 724 (D.C. 2003) (“Agreements to pay fixed sums 
plainly without reasonable relation to any probable damage which may follow a breach will 
not be enforced.”); TAL Fin. Corp. v. CSC Consulting, Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Mass. 
2006)(“[L]iquidated damages will not be enforced if the sum is ‘grossly disproportionate to 
a reasonable estimate of actual damages’ made at the time of contract formation.” (quoting 
Kelley v. Marx, 705 N.E. 2d 1114, 1116 (Mass. 1999)); Ins. Co. of the W. v. Gibson Tile Co., 
134 P.3d 698, 703 (Nev. 2006) (“[T]he award of punitive damages cannot be based upon a 
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that courts and legislatures pay too little attention to efficiency. Or perhaps 
there are other, noneconomic reasons for keeping the rules. Either way, it 
should be easier to convince courts to take a smaller step. Contractual duties to 
create, preserve, or share information so as to promote recovery for first-order 
breach constitute a well-defined, limited class of terms, where the reasons for 
allowing extracompensatory remedies are easy to grasp and where penalties or 
punitive damages do not threaten more general intuitions about the proper 
limits of contractual liability. Presented with the right arguments, courts might 
be willing to enforce a penalty or punitive damages clause for obstructive 
breach. 
iii. contracting for fraud liability 
In the absence of effective contract remedies, legal actors have had to look 
elsewhere to secure cooperation in recovery. The first two Parts of this Article 
have provided an armchair analysis of why parties might want no-obstruct 
terms (when they are the cheapest way of addressing underenforcement) and 
how such terms can be effective (when backed by extracompensatory remedies 
that avoid the catch-22 of proving actual harm). This Part takes an empirical 
turn and describes how courts and parties have attempted to secure such duties 
in the face of the rules against penalties and punitive damages. In the absence 
of a contractual solution, they have turned to the extracompensatory remedies 
available in tort. 
The most striking and potentially powerful approach lies in attempts to 
piggyback on the punitive damages available in fraud by contracting for 
representations about performance. I have already mentioned two examples: 
the Richmond stadium construction contract, which required the builder to 
certify that work was done to specification, and the Alabama oil and gas royalty 
contracts, which required Exxon to submit royalty reports. In both cases, 
compensatory damages for the obstructive breach (false certificates of 
compliance or false royalty statements) provided insufficient protection against 
obstructive breach as a result of the now familiar catch-22. And in each, the 
plaintiff invoked the law of fraud as an additional source of legal liability, albeit 
with varying degrees of success. 
The potential value of fraud liability in these transactions shows that 
contract duties to represent performance are not just a place where fraud and 
 
cause of action sounding solely in contract.”); Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 84 
P.3d 1154, 1161 (Utah 2003) (“[P]unitive damages are recoverable only for torts, not for 
breach of contract.”). 
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contract happen to overlap. Fraud liability for the breach of such terms can play 
a positive role within the contracting relationship. This parallels a claim Ian 
Ayres and I have made about the utility of fraud liability for precontractual 
misrepresentations of intent.68 But there is also something new here. While 
there has been a fair amount of academic discussion as to whether, when, and 
how parties should be permitted to contract out of liability for fraud,69 my 
analysis indicates that some parties are trying to contract into fraud liability. 
Parties appear to be using the law of fraud to get the extracompensatory 
remedies for obstruction that contract law denies them. The existence of these 
terms is evidence that effective duties to cooperate are not only useful in 
theory, but sought-after in practice. But this salutary use of fraud faces its own 
doctrinal obstacles, most recently in the form of an expansive reading of the 
economic loss rule. Perhaps held captive by the theory of efficient breach, 
courts have overlooked this positive role fraud liability can play in contracting 
relationships. 
Fraud liability for misrepresentations about performance is not the only 
way the punitive damages available in tort can be used to enforce contractual 
duties to cooperate.70 Before examining the fraud option, I discuss California’s 
brief experiment with punitive tort damages for obstruction of recovery, first 
announced in 1984 in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.71 
While Seaman’s is most often criticized as an example of the generic tort of bad 
faith breach, attention to the holding shows that it rightly singled out 
obstructive behavior for penalization. The real problem with Seaman’s is not 
that it imported tort liability into the land of contract. The problem is its vague 
yet mandatory rule that punitive damages should be available for all postbreach 
obstruction, rather than a rule permitting parties to contract into or out of such 
remedies and also specify the relevant duty. 
I then describe how fraud liability for misrepresentations about 
performance can correct for this defect, though many courts frown on this 
 
68.  AYRES & KLASS, supra note 6. 
69.  See supra note 5. 
70.  The three techniques I discuss are not the only ones available. Recording artists have tried 
and generally failed to impose on recording companies a fiduciary duty to account for 
royalty payments. See S. 1034, 2002-2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2003). Like fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty can permit the recovery of punitive damages, effectively deterring obstructive 
behavior. A downside of fiduciary duties as compared to fraud liability is their lack of 
specificity. Rather than the relatively clear duty to be honest, there is a relatively amorphous 
duty of loyalty. See Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations 
of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 934-40 (2006); D. Gordon Smith, 
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1406-11 (2002). 
71.  686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984). 
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intrusion of fraud into contractual relationships. Yet a third technique for 
preventing obstruction uses the law of promissory fraud. Representations of 
intent not to obstruct, backed by the law of fraud, can provide a promisee some 
assurance that the promisor will cooperate in recovery. In the last Section of 
this Part, I argue that fraud liability, while potentially effective in securing 
some duties to cooperate in recovery, is a second-best solution. 
A. An Early Foray: Rereading Seaman’s Direct Buying Services v. Standard 
Oil 
The analysis of Parts I and II sheds new light on California’s brief 
experiment with the tort of postbreach bad faith behavior. In 1984, the 
California Supreme Court held in Seaman’s Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil 
Co. that “a party to a contract may incur tort remedies [“including punitive 
damages”] when, in addition to breaching the contract, it seeks to shield itself 
from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the 
contract exists.”72 That is, certain postbreach denials of the contract were 
grounds for punitive damages in tort. Seaman’s sowed a fair amount of 
confusion in the lower courts, which arrived at a variety of standards for 
determining when a defendant’s behavior was so wrongful as to constitute the 
tort.73 Eleven years later, the California Supreme Court, citing inter alia the 
greater efficiency of compensatory measures, expressly overruled Seaman’s and 
abandoned the experiment.74 
Seaman’s is often criticized as an example of the tortification of bad faith 
breach in general. This expansive reading is partly attributable to the case’s 
procedural history. The plaintiff had asked the court to recognize the broader 
tort of bad faith breach, extending the rule from the insurance context to all 
commercial claims. And the majority left open the possibility of recognizing 
such a tort in a later case, with Chief Justice Bird arguing in a partial 
 
72.  Id. 
73.  For surveys of the variety of lower-court interpretations of Seaman’s, see, for example, 
Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995); Landsdorf, supra note 
35, at 222-35. The furthest extension of Seaman’s by the lower courts appears to have been in 
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Ct. App. 1986), which “extend[ed] Seaman’s to 
bad faith attempt to deprive employee of contractual benefits.” Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 
675. 
74.  Freeman & Mills, 900 P.2d at 676-77. Dodge argues that the real turning point was as early 
as 1988, when the California Supreme Court declined to extend Seaman’s to employment 
contracts. Dodge, supra note 59, at 642 (discussing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 
373 (Cal. 1988)). 
0002.KLASS 10/25/2007  11:02 AM 
contracting for cooperation in recovery 
39 
 
concurrence that “[a] breach of contract may also constitute a tortious breach 
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a situation where the 
possibility that the contract will be breached is not accepted or reasonably 
expected by the parties.”75 Commentators therefore read Seaman’s as 
representing more than it said—as putting California on the road to a general 
tort of bad faith breach.76 That reading was amplified by the fact that contort 
was in the air in the mid-1980s, and by the perceived need to repel assaults on 
freedom of contract.77 Judge Kozinski expressed the common reading and 
wisdom as follows: 
Nowhere but in the Cloud Cuckooland of modern tort theory could a 
case like this have been concocted. One large corporation is 
complaining that another obstinately refused to acknowledge they had 
a contract. For this shocking misconduct it is demanding millions of 
dollars in punitive damages. I suppose we will next be seeing lawsuits 
seeking punitive damages for maliciously refusing to return telephone 
calls or adopting a condescending tone in interoffice memos. Not every 
slight, nor even every wrong, ought to have a tort remedy. The 
intrusion of courts into every aspect of life, and particularly into every 
type of business relationship, generates serious costs and uncertainties, 
trivializes the law, and denies individuals and businesses the autonomy 
of adjusting mutual rights and responsibilities through voluntary 
contractual agreement.78 
 But whether or not Seaman’s was part of a larger trend, what it said was 
relatively narrow: tort damages are appropriate where “a contracting party 
seek[s] to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim by adopting a 
‘stonewall’ position (‘see you in court’) without probable cause and with no 
belief in the existence of a defense.”79 Stonewalling of this sort is, in my terms, 
 
75.  686 P.2d at 1167; id. at 1174 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
76.  See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 59, at 638 n.33; E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract 
Law During the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 205 (1990); Friedmann, 
supra note 63, at 19 n.62; Curtis Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There 
a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 270-71 (2003). But see Shiffrin, supra note 
10, at 723 n.27 (recognizing the limited scope of Seaman’s). 
77.  See, e.g., John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon 
Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1600-54 
(1986). 
78.  Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring). 
79.  686 P.2d at 1167. 
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obstruction of recovery. Read narrowly, the Seaman’s rule does not impose a 
Cloud Cuckooland generic duty of good manners, but is supported by many of 
the above arguments for permitting the parties to adopt extracompensatory 
remedies for obstructive breach. Thus court-assessed compensatory damages 
alone neither insure against nor deter the sort of stonewalling at issue in 
Seaman’s. Punitive damages or other extracompensatory remedies are 
necessary.80 Moreover, where there is a measure of distrust and uncertainty at 
the outset of a deal, the parties themselves might rationally prefer Seaman’s 
protection. A promisee who knows that the promisor faces a significant 
deterrent against unreasonably denying the existence of the contract knows she 
is more likely to recover in the case of nonperformance, and will therefore be 
more willing to enter into the transaction. Finally, Kozinski is simply wrong 
when he writes that Seaman’s “denies individuals and businesses the autonomy 
of adjusting mutual rights and responsibilities through voluntary contractual 
agreement.”81 Parts I and II have shown that the rules against penalties and 
punitive damages already deny parties the ability to contract for meaningful 
duties to cooperate in recovery. Seaman’s simply flipped the rule. Where before 
there was never meaningful legal liability for postbreach obstruction, Seaman’s 
held that such behavior should always be subject to punitive liability in tort. 
This does not mean that California should have kept the Seaman’s rule, 
which suffered from serious defects. The experience of lower courts shows that 
Seaman’s failed to define the wrong with sufficient precision.82 The predictable 
result of the duty’s vague definition was that the threat of punitive damages 
deterred defendants from raising legitimate defenses and caused plaintiffs to 
 
80.  Michael Dorff is therefore wrong when, criticizing the application of punitive damages in 
Seaman’s, he states that “the consequences of denying the contract’s existence would be 
virtually identical to the consequences of any other complete contract breach, and the parties 
would be expected to negotiate about the risks of a complete breach.” Michael Dorff, 
Attaching Tort Claims to Contract Actions: An Economic Analysis of Contort, 28 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 390, 423 (1997). 
81.  Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
82.  See supra note 73. Kozinski correctly diagnosed this problem: 
[Seaman’s] created a cause of action so nebulous in outline and so unpredictable 
in application that it more resembles a brick thrown from a third story window 
than a rule of law. Seaman’s gives nary a hint as to how to distinguish a bad faith 
denial that a contract exists, from a dispute over contract terms, from a 
permissible attempt to rescind a contract, or from a loosely worded disclaimer of 
continued contractual responsibility. 
Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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overlitigate minor claims in the hopes of big payoffs.83 The California Supreme 
Court might have tried to fix this problem by clarifying the definition of 
“stonewalling” and by limiting it to highly verifiable behavior, so as to exclude 
both discretion and false positives. But replacing the “in bad faith and without 
probable cause” standard with a narrower test would have robbed the Seaman’s 
rule of much of its utility. Because postbreach obstruction comes in endless 
varieties, generic narrow rules will invite circumvention and have limited 
effect.84 
These difficulties result from a deeper problem with the Seaman’s 
approach: the court’s attempt to address obstruction of recovery by creating a 
new tort rather than by modifying the law of contracts. Because tort law 
provides one-size-fits-all solutions, the Seaman’s court had to rely on its own 
understanding of “accepted notions of business ethics,”85 ignoring the 
industry- and context-dependence of such norms. More generally, why should 
courts attempt to fashion generic no-obstruct rules when the parties, if given 
the tools, can generate rules to fit their particular needs and circumstances?86 
Rather than the one-size-fits-all rules of tort law, the better approach lies 
within the contractual framework. The parties to a transaction know best what 
duties will increase the probability of enforcement. If they want to prohibit 
stonewalling or other forms of obstruction, let them specify both the relevant 
duty and the remedy for its breach. 
B. Contracting for Fraud Liability 
There is one species of tort liability and extracompensatory remedy that 
contracting parties might easily opt into: liability for fraud. A speaker exposes 
 
83.  See Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Seaman’s throws kerosene on the 
litigation bonfire by holding out the allure of punitive damages, a golden carrot that entices 
into court parties who might otherwise be inclined to resolve their differences.”); Lynch & 
Freytag v. Cooper, 267 Cal. Rptr. 189, 195-96 (Ct. App. 1990) (suggesting that minor 
contract action was litigated overzealously due to the “allure of punitive damages”). 
84.  Cf. Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1988-92 (2006) 
(collecting examples of similar observations about the law of fraud). 
85.  686 P.2d at 1167. 
86.  In fact, Seaman’s recognized the parties’ ability “to shape the contours of their agreement 
and to include provisions for attorney fees and liquidated damages in the event of 
breach. . . . [T]hey are free, within reasonable limits at least, to agree upon the standards by 
which application of the covenant [of good faith] is to be measured.” 686 P.2d at 1167. 
While allowing that the availability of party choice counseled caution in applying tort 
remedies in the contract setting, the court did not discuss whether parties might opt-out of 
or contractually modify the Seaman’s tort. 
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himself to fraud liability when he makes material representations on which the 
listener is likely reasonably to rely. If the parties can contract for such 
representations, they potentially can secure for themselves extracompensatory 
remedies for obstructive breach by way of the law of fraud. The idea is to tailor 
informational duties not to obstruct so that their nonperformance qualifies not 
only as breach, but also as deceit. The most obvious example is a requirement 
that the promisor say whether he has breached. A duty to inform about 
performance, if backed by the law of fraud, gives the promisor in first-order 
breach three options: honestly inform the promisee of nonperformance; 
decline to make the representation, breaching the no-obstruct duty and 
effectively communicating to the promisee that there may be a first-order 
breach; or falsely represent that he has performed, exposing himself to punitive 
damages for fraud. Timely information about performance is secured by the 
extracompensatory remedies available for misrepresentation. 
In fact, piggybacking on the law of fraud has a potential advantage over 
liability in contract. While contracts are governed by principles of strict 
liability, liability for fraud requires proof of scienter—that the 
misrepresentation was intentional or reckless.87 This protects promisors 
against large punitive damage awards for small mistakes in complying with 
their no-obstruct duties. The scienter requirement also provides some measure 
of assurance against false allegations of obstructive breach, since the promisee 
not only has to show nonperformance, but also intent or recklessness.88 
While it is difficult to say from the outside exactly why contracts have the 
terms they do, there is evidence that parties attempt to use this strategy. 
Consider Alabama’s gas and oil leases with Exxon, which required that Exxon 
represent that its royalty payments complied with the contract. The jury 
determined that Exxon both underpaid and intentionally misrepresented the 
basis for the payments. The trial court held that the first breach warranted 
compensatory damages, while the second supported punitive damages in 
fraud.89 In Holmesian terms, Exxon had the right to breach and pay damages, 
but not to lie about it in contractually required representations. 
This sort of fraud claim is perhaps most common in royalty disputes, but is 
not limited to them.90 The city of Richmond’s fraud claim against the 
 
87.  W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984). 
88.  See, e.g., Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 747 F.2d 1217, 1222 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding 
that evidence was insufficient to establish requisite scienter for some claimed 
misrepresentations as to sales figures connected to royalty payments). 
89.  Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 1, 20-25, 62. 
90.  See, e.g., Morrill, 747 F.2d at 1220 (false royalty statements to inventor); Gregory v. Chem. 
Waste Mgmt., Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 598 (W.D. Tenn. 1996) (false waste-disposal facility 
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contractor in McDevitt was based on false certificates of completion and other 
required documents.91 In Life Insurance Co. v. Murray Investment Co., the 
purchaser of real estate notes claimed fraud based on contractually required 
quarterly reports that misrepresented progress on a construction project.92 And 
in Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., a helicopter maker sued a supplier for 
fraud based on required certificates of compliance that falsely represented that 
parts met contractual specifications.93 Robinson Helicopter in particular repays 
close study: while the facts and holding demonstrate the potential utility of 
fraud liability for obstructive breach, the opinions in the case illustrate the 
doctrinal hurdles this salutary use of tort liability faces. 
Robinson Helicopter began purchasing clutch mechanisms from Dana 
Corporation for use in its helicopters in 1984.94 Robinson’s purchase orders 
required that shipments be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance, which 
stated that the clutches met contractual specifications.95 Dana regularly 
included the certificates, though clutches shipped between July 1996 and 
October 1997 were noncompliant. High failure rates resulted in the discovery 
of Dana’s first-order breach, and Robinson sued for breach of contract, breach 
of warranty, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation. The California 
Supreme Court upheld the jury award of $1.5 million in compensatory 
damages for the breach of contract and warranty, and an additional $6 million 
in punitive damages, the latter based on the jury’s finding that in providing the 
certificates, Dana had made false representations of fact and had knowingly 
misrepresented or concealed material facts with the intent to defraud.96 
From the perspective of this Article, this was the right outcome. The 
certificates of compliance apparently corrected for two worries Robinson had 
going into the transaction. The first was the difficulty of observing certain sorts 
of breach. At issue in the case was the metallurgical integrity of the clutches, 
 
royalty statements); Reis v. Peabody Coal Co., 997 S.W.2d 49, 68, 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) 
(false royalty statements and misrepresentations as to compliance with most-favored-nation 
clause); Apple Records, Inc. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 137 A.D.2d 50, 56 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988) (false royalty statements in recording contract); Oestreicher v. Am. Nat’l Stores, Inc., 
225 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. 1976) (false royalty sales statements); Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas 
Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1997) (false oil royalty statements). For another nonroyalty 
case, see Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada Ltd., 683 N.Y.S.2d 24 (App. Div. 1998) (false 
statement of annual profits used as basis for bonus). 
91.  Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 1998). 
92.  646 F.2d 224, 225-27 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). 
93.  102 P.3d 268 (Cal. 2004). 
94.  Id. at 271. 
95.  See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 686 n.6 (Ct. App. 2003). 
96.  Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 274-75. 
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which was presumably difficult or expensive to detect. Second, if such a breach 
was not discovered early, Robinson would likely suffer significant 
noncompensable damages. Systematic clutch failures would result not only in 
possibly catastrophic liability, but also regulatory noncompliance, loss of 
reputation, and other nonrecoverables. Robinson might have attempted to 
capture some of these first-order harms in a liquidated damages clause. But 
there was the risk that a court would view the high liquidated damages amount 
as a penalty and therefore unenforceable. The parties therefore constructed a 
contract that permitted Dana the usual option of breaching and paying 
unliquidated compensatory damages, but effectively required that it 
immediately inform Robinson of such breach—by not sending the clutches or 
by not including the Certificate of Compliance. This no-obstruct duty to share 
information about performance was structured such that any injurious breach 
would involve misrepresentation. In this way, the parties were able to attach 
extracompensatory damages, by way of liability for fraud, to the most salient 
form of obstruction. 
One can imagine other ways to structure a contract so as to secure 
cooperation in recovery via fraud liability. Recall the hypothetical reporting 
clause. Unlike the Robinson-Dana contract, in which performance was 
episodic, the imagined contract between Developer and Contractor envisions a 
continuous period of performance.97 Rather than arbitrarily chosen daily, 
weekly, or monthly performance reports (“I am not in breach”), Developer 
might prefer that Contractor be required immediately to report any breach (“I 
have breached”), where failure to report would expose Contractor to liability 
for fraudulent concealment.98 The reporting clause is cheaper than the 
certificate of compliance requirement in Robinson Helicopter. Instead of regular 
reports of compliance, there is at most one communication, and that only in 
the case of breach. This means cost savings both in the number of reports and 
in their value: a contemporaneous report of breach conveys to the promisor 
just the information she needs at the moment she needs it most. As a doctrinal 
matter, however, recovery for fraud might be more difficult under the 
reporting clause. While the false certificates of compliance at issue in Robinson 
Helicopter involved garden-variety misrepresentations (Dana said it performed 
when it had not), breach of the reporting clause qualifies as fraud only under a 
theory of fraudulent concealment. It appears to be an open question whether, 
 
97.  For an even better example, see the discussion of the RIO and RIO2 contracts in the 
Conclusion. 
98.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 550 (1997). 
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as a doctrinal matter, fraud by silence applies when the duty to speak is purely 
contractual.99 
There is, however, a larger obstacle to the whole project of incorporating 
fraud liability with contractual duties to represent: the tendency of courts to 
exclude tort liability from contractual relationships. The strong pull in this 
direction is exemplified by the various opinions in Robinson Helicopter and their 
uniformly expansive reading of the economic loss rule. Given that the 
American Law Institute is undertaking a revision of the Restatement’s 
treatment of that rule, this reading deserves scrutiny.100 
The economic loss rule “precludes a recovery in tort where the sale of a 
defective product has resulted in no property damage or bodily injury, but only 
economic loss to the buyer of that product.”101 The doctrine first emerged in 
the mid-1960s as a means of drawing the line between, on the one hand, 
breach of warranty and, on the other, strict product liability and negligence.102 
The first articulations of the rule held that so long as a defect did not cause the 
purchaser physical injury or property damage, she could recover only in 
contract—only for breach of warranty. Early cases did not decide whether the 
doctrine extended to intentional torts. 
In the past decade, several courts have held that the economic loss rule bars 
liability in fraud between contracting parties except for “acts considered to be 
 
99.  I have been able to locate only one case applying fraudulent suppression based on a 
contractual duty to disclose. Gregory v. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 2d 598 
(W.D. Tenn. 1996), held that there was a duty to disclose where the contract warranted that 
the defendant’s representations “do not and will not include any untrue statement of 
material fact or fail to include any material fact, all to the end that such statements are not 
misleading.” Id. at 612 (emphasis omitted). The court concluded that the defendant 
breached the resultant duty to disclose when it did not reveal a change in its manner of 
calculating royalty payments. Id. The fraud claim in that case, however, was also supported 
by affirmative misrepresentations in the royalty statements. Id. at 611-12. The reason there 
are not more examples of fraudulent concealment based on contractual duties to disclose is 
not difficult to discern: the vast majority of cases and commentary on fraud by silence 
concern fraud in the inducement, before a contract exists. See, e.g., 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and 
Deceit § 204 (2006); Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General Theory of 
Nondisclosure, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 329 (1991). 
100.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8 (Preliminary 
Draft No. 2, 2006).  
101.  Robinson Helicopter, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684. 
102.  As Justice Traynor explained in the seminal case, “[t]he history of the doctrine of strict 
liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of 
the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem 
of physical injuries.” Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 149 (Cal. 1965) (Traynor, 
C.J.). 
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independent from acts that breached the contract.”103 Courts define 
“independent” in different ways. Many, including the intermediate appellate 
court in Robinson Helicopter, pay particular attention to whether the 
misrepresentation occurred before or after formation—to the distinction 
“between fraud in the inducement of the contract, which is not barred by the 
economic loss rule, and fraudulent misrepresentations relating to the 
performance of the contract, which are barred.”104 Fraud in the inducement, 
these courts reason, cannot interfere with contractually chosen risk allocation. 
When fraud in the inducement occurs, the contract does not yet exist, and 
fraudulent inducement means that the promisee’s agreement to the contractual 
allocation of risk is not truly voluntary.105 Misrepresentations in the course of 
performance, on the other hand, are understood to be “interwoven with the 
breach of contract,”106 so liability for fraud in the performance should be 
governed exclusively by the contractual allocation of risk. 
This expansive reading of the economic loss rule prevents the use of 
liability in fraud to secure information-sharing duties that promote recovery. 
The relevant misrepresentations in these cases are necessarily “interwoven” 
with the breach, for the contract requires the promisor to make them 
truthfully. For example, the intermediate court in Robinson Helicopter 
concluded that Robinson “has neither claimed nor established any fraudulent 
 
103.  HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239 (Fla. 1996). The 
leading case adopting this approach is Huron Tool & Engineering Co. v. Precision Consulting 
Services, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541, 544-45 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). See also Dinsmore Instrument 
Co. v. Bombardier, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 968, 971-72 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Valleyside Dairy 
Farms, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 944 F. Supp. 612, 616-17 (W.D. Mich. 1995); Kaloti 
Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W.2d 205, 219-21 (Wis. 2005). For academic 
discussions, see Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Consumers: 
Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 829 (2006); Steven C. Tourek, Thomas H. Byrd & Charles J. Schoenwetter, Bucking 
the “Trend”: The Uniform Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law 
Causes of Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 IOWA L. REV. 875 (1999); R. Joseph 
Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and 
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789 (2000). 
104.  129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 695; see Tourek et al., supra note 103, at 895-912; Barton, supra note 103, 
at 1802-12. Some courts have taken the further step of applying the economic loss rule to 
“foreclose tort claims against the defendant who fraudulently induces the contract by 
representations about the character and quality of the goods or services sold.” Dan B. 
Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 729 
(2006). 
105.  See, e.g., Robinson Helicopter, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697. 
106.  Huron Tool, 532 N.W.2d at 545. 
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representation or concealment that was not intertwined with Dana’s 
performance of its contract and warranty breaches.”107 
The California Supreme Court rejected that holding, stating without 
further explanation that “the economic loss rule does not bar Robinson’s fraud 
and intentional misrepresentation claims because they were independent of 
Dana’s breach of contract.”108 The court avoided a broad ruling on whether or 
when the economic loss rule applies to fraud in the performance by limiting its 
holding “to a defendant’s affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff 
relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the 
plaintiff’s economic loss.”109 While less than crystalline, this statement suggests 
that the California Supreme Court agrees that the economic loss rule bars 
recovery for most fraud in the performance, or fraud that is intertwined with 
the breach. 
There is considerable irony in applying the economic loss rule to defeat 
fraud liability in cases like Robinson Helicopter. One of the most commonly cited 
reasons for excluding tort liability from contractual relationships is that it 
interferes with the parties’ chosen allocation of risk. As the U.S. Supreme 
Court has explained: 
The commercial buyer and commercial seller can negotiate a contract—
a warranty—that will set the terms of compensation for product failure. 
If the buyer obtains a warranty, he will receive compensation for the 
product’s loss, whether the product explodes or just refuses to start. If 
the buyer does not obtain a warranty, he will likely receive a lower price 
in return. Given the availability of warranties, the courts should not ask 
tort law to perform a job that contract law might perform better.110 
 
107.  129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697; see also Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 510 
(S.D. 1997) (Amundson, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that there is no fraud liability 
where the contract “impliedly create[d] the obligation to make true factual 
representations”). But see Grynberg, 573 N.W.2d at 501 (majority opinion) (holding that false 
royalty statements, though required by contract, violated a separate obligation to refrain 
from invading the property of others by fraud). 
108.  Robinson Helicopter, 102 P.3d at 274-75. 
109.  Id. at 276 (emphasis added). Other factors emphasized by the California Supreme Court 
likely to distinguish Robinson Helicopter from future cases include the impact of Dana’s 
breach on public safety and the fact that the improper clutches put Robinson out of 
compliance with FAA regulations. See id. at 274 n.7. 
110.  Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 880 (1997); see also, e.g., Clark v. 
Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998) (“When the economic loss rule has been applied, 
the parties usually were in a position to bargain freely concerning the allocation of risk 
. . . .”); Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 672 (N.J. 1985) 
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This rationale makes sense when the tort at issue is negligence or product 
liability, both of which typically provide compensatory damages only. But it 
makes no sense when the wrong is fraud. The parties in Robinson Helicopter 
could not have accomplished with contract liability what they got with liability 
in fraud—extracompensatory damages for obstructive breach. Applying the 
economic loss rule in this context does not protect the parties’ chosen allocation 
of risk, but defeats it.111 
Despite its defects, California’s potentially expansive reading of the 
economic loss rule agrees with the approaches of several other jurisdictions, 
including Michigan, Florida, and Wisconsin.112 Nor is the economic loss rule 
the only bar to fraud liability between contracting parties.113 In McDevitt, the 
 
(“Contract principles . . . are generally more appropriate for determining claims for 
consequential damage that the parties have, or could have, addressed in their agreement.”); 
Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 11 (Utah 2003) (“Whether the doctrine is 
asserted in terms of economic loss or independent duty, the underlying reasoning remains 
the same: tort law should govern the duties and liabilities imposed by legislatures and 
courts upon non-consenting members of society, and contract law should govern the 
bargained-for duties and liabilities of persons who exercise freedom of contract.”); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8 cmt. b (Preliminary 
Draft No. 2, 2006) (noting that rationales for the economic loss rule include 
“[e]ncourag[ing] private ordering” and “preserving the priority of contract law”). 
111.  The above analysis is significantly different from other arguments for excluding fraud from 
the economic loss rule. For instance, Tourek, Boyd, and Schoenwetter maintain that the rule 
should not apply to fraud because, among other things, “[a]s a practical matter, it is difficult 
to see how a party can effectively anticipate and therefore negotiate the allocation of risks for 
every type of misrepresentation and every form of deceit that may be perpetrated by the 
other party to an agreement.” Tourek et al., supra note 103, at 916; see also Stoughton 
Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227, 1236 (W.D. Wis. 1997) (“A party to a 
contract cannot rationally calculate the possibility that the other party will deliberately 
misrepresent terms critical to that contract.”); Dobbs, supra note 104, at 731 (“Where the 
parties have not agreed to subject a given risk or dispute to the contract’s terms, to apply the 
economic loss rule is not to honor the contract but rather to impose a contract limitation 
where none was intended . . . .”). My argument is exactly the opposite: when it comes to 
contractually required representations, the parties might anticipate and prefer allocating the 
risk of misrepresentation in accordance with the law of fraud, but the expansive reading of 
the economic loss rule prevents them from doing so. 
112.  See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996); Huron Tool 
& Eng’g Co. v. Precision Consulting Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 541 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); 
Kaloti Enters., Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 699 N.W.2d 205 (Wis. 2005); see also AKA Distrib. 
Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 137 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying Minnesota law); Cooper 
Power Sys., Inc. v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 123 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(applying Wisconsin law). 
113.  For a summary overview, see Dorff, supra note 80, at 407-11. For other examples of how 
these doctrines have been applied to concealment of breach cases, see Catherine Paskoff 
Chang, Note, Two Wrongs Can Make Two Rights: Why Courts Should Allow Tortious Recovery 
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Virginia Supreme Court ruled that “[i]n determining whether a cause of action 
sounds in contract or tort, the source of the duty violated must be ascertained,” 
where a noncontractual source means no fraud liability.114 The Nebraska 
Supreme Court has required that a fraud plaintiff allege “separate and distinct 
factual occurrences that could stand alone as a separate cause of action 
sounding in tort.”115 And Ohio courts have held that  
[i]n addition to containing a duty independent of that created by 
contract, an action arising out of contract which is also based upon 
tortious conduct must include actual damages attributable to the 
wrongful acts of the alleged tortfeasor which are in addition to those 
attributable to the breach of the contract.116  
Each of these rules prevents the parties from using the law of fraud to contract 
for effective duties to cooperate in recovery. All are misguided according to this 
Article’s analysis. 
 
for Intentional Concealment of Contract Breach, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 47, 66-72 
(2005). 
Not all courts exclude liability from the contract setting. See, e.g., Morrill v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 747 F.2d 1217, 1222 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[U]nder Missouri law, liability in tort 
may co-exist with liability in contract arising out of the same events.”); Life Ins. Co. v. 
Murray Inv. Co., 646 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (“[U]nder Texas law, if the 
act complained of constitutes both a breach of contract and a willful tort, exemplary 
damages are recoverable.”). And the tendency to exclude tort is of relatively recent origin. 
See WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1954). Prosser himself was in favor of a broad overlap between tort 
and contract: “When the ghosts of case and assumpsit walk hand in hand at midnight, it is 
sometimes a convenient and comforting thing to have a borderland in which they may lose 
themselves.” Id. at 452. 
114.  507 S.E.2d at 347; see also Americana Petroleum Corp. v. Northville Indus. Corp., 606 
N.Y.S.2d 906, 908 (App. Div. 1994) (“[I]n order to state a cause of action sounding in 
fraud, the plaintiff must allege a breach of duty which is collateral or extraneous to the 
contract between the parties.”). 
115.  Cimino v. FirsTier Bank, 530 N.W.2d 606, 613 (Neb. 1995). 
116.  Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1271 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1996) (emphasis omitted); see also Chachere v. Drake, 941 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. App. 1996) 
(“The mere availability of a tort-based theory of recovery is not sufficient; actual damages 
sustained from an independent tort must be proven before punitive damages are 
available.”). 
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C. Promissory Representations of No Intent To Obstruct 
There is another way a promisor might use fraud liability to assure the 
promisee that he will not obstruct recovery: by making a legally backed 
representation of intent not to obstruct. While precontractual representations 
of intent do not provide the assurance of a postformation representation of 
performance, they are of theoretical interest and can make a difference at the 
margins. 
The doctrine of promissory fraud interprets every contractual promise as 
representing that the promisor intends to perform and imposes liability for 
fraud where that representation is false—that is, where the promise is made 
without an intent to perform. Punitive damages for promissory fraud add value 
to contracting relationships.117 Where damages for breach are systematically 
subcompensatory, a promisor who intends to perform wants a credible means 
of sharing that information. A representation of intent to perform, backed by 
the law of fraud, gives it to him. 
By the same token, if standard breach of contract damages cannot protect 
against obstruction (not because they are subcompensatory, but because the 
proof structure of proximate harm renders them largely irrelevant), perhaps 
credible representations of intent not to obstruct can. A promisee who is 
worried about obstruction presumably believes first-order breach is a real 
possibility—even if the promisor presently intends to perform. To convince the 
promisee that she will be able to recover, the promisor might represent not 
only that he intends to perform, but also that he intends to cooperate in 
recovery (by adequate recordkeeping, by informing her of breach, etc.) should 
the first intent fail. Such a representation can, if credible, assure the promisee 
that she will recover for any first-order breach. The law lends credibility to 
such representations of intent not to obstruct by imposing fraud liability when 
they are false. 
Because the doctrine of promissory fraud holds that every promise 
represents an intent to perform, a promisor’s agreement to a no-obstruct term 
represents that he intends not to engage in that form of obstruction—and 
should bring with it the added benefit of promissory fraud protection. Thus 
the Dixie Chicks recently alleged that Sony Music not only breached its 
contractual duty to “permit them to conduct meaningful audits to ascertain the 
accuracy of its accountings,” but entered the contract intending that obstructive 
 
117.  AYRES & KLASS, supra note 6, at 59-82. 
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breach.118 It is unclear what evidence the Dixie Chicks had to back up that 
claim, which was dismissed early in the litigation,119 but one can imagine cases 
where a plaintiff could make the showing and recover punitive damages for the 
misrepresentation of an intent to cooperate. 
There are, therefore, two ways to represent an intent not to obstruct 
recovery backed by the law of fraud: expressly (“I intend to keep such-and-
such records.”), and implicitly, as part of a promise not to obstruct (“Party A 
shall keep such-and-such records.”). Yet a third way would exist if courts 
adopted an interpretive rule that, absent evidence to the contrary, every first-
order promise represents not only an intent to perform, but also an intent to 
cooperate in recovery. That is, the law might stipulate that among the default 
representations embedded in a legally binding promise is a representation that 
the promisor does not intend to obstruct recovery should he fail to perform. 
This default makes sense given the law’s general interest in the effectiveness of 
legal remedies. A generic default, however, might have Seaman’s-like bad 
consequences. Seaman’s imposed a duty so amorphous that parties did not 
know what was required of them. At the very least, one would want the 
content of the default representation of intent to cooperate spelled out in detail, 
with a clear and predictable definition of what counts as obstruction, so 
promisors know just what they are representing their intentions to be. 
D. The Limitations of Liability in Fraud 
So we have two ways parties might use fraud liability to circumvent the 
rules against penalties and punitive damages and contract for effective duties 
not to obstruct recovery. The first is by including in the contract a duty to 
make a representation about performance; the second is by representing an 
intent not to obstruct. These fraud solutions are, however, second best.  
This is most obvious with respect to liability for misrepresentations of 
intent. While credible representations of intent to cooperate in recovery can 
provide some additional assurance at the outset of the transaction, such 
representations offer less protection than an effective contractual duty. For one 
thing, people change their minds. The promisor who now intends to cooperate 
 
118.  Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Robison, No. 01 Civ. 6415, 2002 WL 272406, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 26, 2002). Representatives of the Beatles have recently made similar allegations against 
Capitol Records. See Apple Corps Ltd. v. Capitol Records, Inc., No. 05-604385, slip op. at 4-
5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 23, 2006). 
119.  Sony Music, 2002 WL 272406, at *2 . The district court dismissed the claim based on a line of 
cases of dubious authority that suggest promissory fraud is not actionable in New York. See 
Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud, N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., May 2006, at 26, 27. 
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in recovery may have a change of heart after breach, when he is faced with a 
choice between, say, falsifying records and paying a large damage award. There 
are also familiar problems of evidence. While it is sometimes possible to prove 
the promisor’s bad initial intent—the smoking-gun internal memo outlining a 
plan to falsify records, repeated instances of similar behavior—the promisor’s 
intent at the time of promising is typically much more difficult to prove than a 
mutually agreed upon contractual duty not to obstruct. 
Opting into fraud liability with contractual duties to represent 
performance, in the form of certificates of compliance, performance records, or 
other required reports, provides a more practically powerful tool. But here too 
there are limits. Most obviously, fraud requires misrepresentation. Fraud 
liability is therefore of no use against obstruction that does not involve a lie, 
like not keeping records or even destroying records. Moreover, if contractual 
duties to speak cannot support claims of fraudulent concealment, parties will 
not be able to craft the duties to share information in the most effective or 
efficient way. 
Fraud also has more elements than breach of contract. While I have argued 
that this is a good thing with respect to scienter, the reliance element can create 
an unwanted hurdle. In Hunt Petroleum Corp. v. Alabama, the Alabama 
Supreme Court found insufficient proof of reliance where there was evidence 
that the state intended to audit royalty statements, and it could not show that it 
changed its position based on the false reports.120 In fact, one can imagine the 
reliance requirement giving rise to a catch-22 of its own. If a royalty recipient 
can discover underpayments only by exercising its auditing rights, and if 
exercising those rights entails not relying on the royalty reports, then false 
reports can never support a claim of fraud. 
Yet another downside concerns the parties’ ability to control their exposure 
to legal liability. When courts permit fraud liability between contracting 
parties, they often refuse to enforce the parties’ attempts to limit their 
exposure. Thus the Delaware Court of Chancery recently held in ABRY 
Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition L.L.C. that “when a seller intentionally 
misrepresents a fact embodied in a contract—that is, when a seller lies—public 
policy will not permit a contractual provision to limit the remedy of the buyer 
to a capped damage claim.”121 Whatever the merits of this rule, familiar worries 
about plaintiff-friendly juries and insufficient judicial oversight mean that 
 
120.  901 So. 2d 1, 6-9 (Ala. 2004). 
121.  891 A.2d 1032, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2006); see also id. at 1056-62 (discussing authorities); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(1) (2006) (“A term exempting a party from 
tort liability for harm caused intentionally or recklessly is unenforceable on grounds of 
public policy.”); Davis, supra note 5, at 488-92, 513-20 (summarizing relevant holdings). 
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many parties will shy away from liability in fraud as a means of securing no-
obstruct duties. 
Finally, there may well be good arguments for a default rule of no liability 
for fraud in the performance. There are many representations about 
performance for which the parties want only contract remedies, the most 
obvious example being warranties. Nor is every contractually required 
representation a representation about first-order performance. Statements of 
an appraiser about the value of a property, for example, are not about the 
appraiser’s performance, but elements of it. Lastly, there is a legitimate worry 
that fraud liability for express, contractually required representations will 
evolve into a more general cause of action for bad faith breach. Thus when the 
trial court in Alabama v. Exxon upheld the jury’s finding of fraud, it pointed not 
only to explicit falsehoods in the royalty reports, but also to the implicit 
representation in each royalty payment that the payment complied with the 
agreement.122 Such reasoning brings us to the place where semantic and legal 
analyses diverge. It may well be reasonable to interpret some contract behavior 
as implicitly representing conformity with the contract. But it does not follow 
that those implicit representations should support a claim of fraud. Where the 
parties have not separately agreed to make representations clearly designed to 
promote enforcement, the arguments for permitting the extracompensatory 
remedies of fraud lose much of their force. In some cases, it may be that the 
parties want duties not to obstruct and would prefer the extra protection of 
fraud liability. But majoritarian and information-forcing considerations, not to 
mention worries about a slippery slope, might recommend a default of no 
fraud liability, forcing parties who want that extra protection to say so in their 
contract. 
The analysis of fraud liability has arrived at a curious place. A no fraud 
liability default, which requires parties who want such liability expressly to 
 
122.  “With each royalty payment it sent to the State, Exxon effectively represented that (i) it was 
paying royalty from gross when it in fact was not, (ii) its gross was less than it in fact was, 
(iii) it was paying the State for all gas produced when it in fact was not and/or (iv) it owed 
the State less than it in fact did.” Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 26. The trial court’s 
theory of fraud was unfortunately expansive in several other directions as well. For one 
thing, the court permitted a finding of fraudulent suppression based on the fact that Exxon 
withheld or provided only partial royalty reports. Id. at 27; see also Grynberg v. Citation Oil 
& Gas Corp., 573 N.W.2d 493, 498-99 (S.D. 1997) (royalty reports not itemized and 
withheld were contrary to contract). Unlike the case where a breaching promisor is 
contractually required to report breach and remains silent, here the absence of required 
reports or information should have put Alabama on notice that there might be a first-order 
breach. Elsewhere the trial court appears to endorse a broader action for bad faith breach: 
“Alabama law surely does not permit a business party such as Exxon to breach a contract as 
it sees fit without fear of punitive damages.” Post-Judgment Order, supra note 22, at 23. 
0002.KLASS 10/25/2007  11:02 AM 
the yale law journal 117:2   2007  
54 
 
agree to it, looks more like a rule of contract than one of tort. Practically 
speaking, it simply permits the parties to attach a certain extracompensatory 
remedy (punitive damages) to a certain category of contract terms (duties to 
represent). But now it is difficult to see why we should not also permit parties 
to specify the extracompensatory remedies they want (adverse inferences, 
penalties, damage caps) and to attach them to the terms that will be most 
effective (no-obstruct duties that may not involve representations). The better 
solution is the contractual one. 
iv. the utility of contractual duties not to obstruct 
Parts I and II demonstrated that parties can contract for effective no-
obstruct duties only if they can also attach penalties or punitive damages to 
their breach. Part III showed that duties to represent performance backed by 
the law of fraud can play the same role and suggested that the existence of such 
terms is evidence that parties want effective contractual duties not to obstruct. I 
have not yet discussed the costs of penalties and punitive damages, or weighed 
them against the potential benefits of effective duties to cooperate. This Part 
returns to the level of theory and fills in that analysis. I first show that many of 
the costs commonly associated with penalties and punitive damages—such as 
preventing efficient breach, creating bad investment incentives, and 
incentivizing opportunistic litigation—are much less likely to apply when those 
remedies are attached to no-obstruct terms. Fulfilling a promise from Part I, I 
then argue that extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach will often 
be the preferred alternative to a more familiar solution to underenforcement: 
first-order damage multipliers. 
A. The Costs of Penalties and Punitive Damages 
There is broad agreement in the economic literature that, in most contexts, 
parties prefer compensatory or subcompensatory damage measures for breach 
of contract, with some version of expectation damages often identified as 
optimal.123 The arguments for why this is so have evolved over the years to the 
 
123.  See, e.g., Rea, supra note 63, at 159 (“[T]he parties to a contract are unlikely to agree ex ante 
to damages that exceed the expected loss.”); Schwartz, supra note 64, at 370 (“[P]romisees 
do not want contractual damage measures that would grant more than their lost 
expectation.”). 
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point where they are fairly subtle. For present purposes, a generic blueprint 
will suffice.124 
Most familiarly, supercompensatory damages (penalties or punitive 
damages) threaten efficient breach. The bilateral monopoly every contract 
creates makes renegotiation difficult, meaning that a promisor faced with a 
penalty or punitive damages is likely to perform in situations where there is 
more value in breach.125 Supercompensatory damages also create the wrong 
incentives earlier in the transaction. The promisor, fearing the large payout 
should he breach, will invest an inefficient amount to ensure his performance, 
while the promisee, who now prefers breach to performance, will take too few 
precautions against nonperformance. In fact, supercompensatory damages 
create a moral hazard for the promisee, giving her a reason to try to induce and 
even falsely allege breach.126 Finally, supercompensatory damages are unlikely 
to result in risk-shifting benefits. The greater the liability a promisor faces for 
breach, the more he will charge the promisee up front. But most promisees are 
either risk-neutral or risk-averse, meaning they will not want to pay more now 
to gamble on the chance of a big payoff for nonperformance later.127 Taken 
together, these bad incentives decrease the aggregate gains of trade from the 
transaction. That is, they decrease the size of the pie the parties have to divide 
between them, a result no one prefers.128 If the above considerations apply 
equally when supercompensatory damages are attached to no-obstruct terms, 
 
124.  For more detailed versions, see Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the 
Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988); Rea, supra note 63, at 151-63; 
Schwartz, supra note 64, at 372-83; and Talley, supra note 60, at 1212-18. The core argument 
presented here omits some considerations, such as the use of penalties as signals, their 
employment as strategic barriers to entry, and their effect on price and selection, as well as 
economic arguments that, in special circumstances, extracompensatory remedies can 
promote efficient investment. For a detailed overview of the literature, see Edlin & Schwartz, 
supra note 4. 
125.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-18 (6th ed. 2003); Talley, supra 
note 60, at 1218-41. But see Clarkson et al., supra note 60, at 360-62; Dodge, supra note 59, at 
632-33, 666-76 (arguing that renegotiation is possible); Goetz & Scott, supra note 63, at 587. 
126.  This moral hazard problem is emphasized by Clarkson et al., supra note 60, at 368-72. See 
also Craswell, supra note 124, at 646-53, 656-61; Rea, supra note 63, at 155. 
127.  See Craswell, supra note 124, at 642-45; Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The 
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2230 (1999); Rea, supra note 
63, at 152-54; Schwartz, supra note 64, at 392. 
128.  Samuel Rea summarizes the arguments as follows: “Penalty clauses are costly because they 
(1) induce excessive precautions by the promisor, (2) induce deficient precautions by the 
promisee, (3) overinsure the promisee, and (4) expose the promisor to additional risk.” Rea, 
supra note 63, at 156. 
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then even if the law were to permit parties to choose penalties or punitive 
damages, they would be unlikely to do so. 
But those considerations do not apply equally. Duties to cooperate share 
four general features that distinguish them from first-order terms. First, 
compliance is relatively cheap. The affirmative no-obstruct duties I have 
described entail only minor administrative costs—keeping records, making 
reports, and the like. And prohibitions on bad acts, like falsifying records or 
hiding breach, cost less to perform than to breach, since it takes effort to 
engage in that obstructive behavior.129 Second, the benefits of cooperative 
performance (increased chance of recovery) are transaction specific. Combined 
with the fact that performance is cheap, this makes it unlikely that 
circumstances will arise in which the resources used to perform a no-obstruct 
duty will create more value invested elsewhere. That is, the opportunity costs 
of performing are minimal or nonexistent. Third, we can predict that many 
promisors going into the transaction will expect to comply with no-obstruct 
duties. This is not only because of low compliance and opportunity costs, but 
also because those duties are special examples of the general virtues of honesty 
and good faith—behaviors many promisors are inclined toward anyway. 
Finally, the promisee’s reliance on no-obstruct duties is of a different sort from 
her first-order reliance. She relies not on sharing in extralegal gains of trade, 
but on the vindication of a purely legal and distributive right—her right to be 
made whole in the case of first-order breach. 
These four characteristic features of contract duties to cooperate entail that 
many inefficiencies commonly associated with penalties and punitive damages 
do not apply when those remedies are attached to no-obstruct terms. Perhaps 
the most important difference is that compliance with the no-obstruct duties is 
generally cheap or free, with respect to both out-of-pocket costs and 
opportunity costs. As a result, obstructive breach is far less likely to result in a 
more efficient reallocation of resources. That is, it is unlikely that the promisee 
will choose to obstruct because the costs of cooperation have gone up or 
because those resources could generate more value elsewhere. Obstructive 
breach is rarely efficient. 
Willful obstructive breach is more likely opportunistic—an attempt to 
recapture a piece of the contractual pie that was bargained away, rather than 
reallocating resources to create more value.130 Opportunism not only creates no 
 
129.  See Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 1352-60. 
130.  For a detailed analysis of the concept of opportunistic breach, see Timothy J. Muris, 
Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 521-26 (1981). See also 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 
1139 n.118 (1981) (“[O]pportunistic behavior only redistributes portions of an already 
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added value, but the threat of opportunistic breach sucks resources from the 
transaction, as “potential opportunists and victims expend resources 
perpetrating and protecting against” it.131 Discouraging opportunistic breaches 
with penalties or punitive damages is therefore not merely efficiency neutral, 
but represents a net gain in value. In Richard Posner’s oft-quoted words: “If a 
promisor breaks his promise merely to take advantage of the vulnerability of 
the promisee . . . we might as well throw the book at [him].”132 
But not all breaches are intentional. Even where compliance is cheap, a 
promisor facing huge liability for obstructive breach might invest too much to 
guarantee that no mistakes are made. A penalty or punitive damages clause 
might cause him to triple-check records, overmonitor employees, or run every 
certificate of compliance by his lawyer—wasted effort as far as everyone is 
concerned.133 
The discussion of fraud liability provides the answer: we can predict that 
contracts that attach penalties or punitive damages to no-obstruct terms will 
limit those remedies to intentional or reckless obstructive breaches. That is, 
parties will contract for an advantage of fraud liability: scienter. Requiring 
proof of scienter insulates the promisor from liability for mere negligence or 
reasonable mistake.134 More to the point, by limiting penalties and punitive 
 
allocated contractual pie.”); Barry Perlstein, Crossing the Contract-Tort Boundary: An 
Economic Argument for the Imposition of Extracompensatory Damages for Opportunistic Breach of 
Contract, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 877, 880 (1992) (“The opportunistic actor creates more value for 
himself, but only by taking an equivalent amount or more from others.”). 
131.  Muris, supra note 130, at 524. 
132.  POSNER, supra note 125, at 118; see also Dodge, supra note 59, at 654-62 (arguing that punitive 
damages for opportunistic breach result in greater efficiency); Richard A. Posner, Common-
Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 745-47 (2006) 
(discussing when punitive damages for breach are appropriate). 
Several academics have suggested permitting penalty clauses for opportunistic breach 
only, though they have proposed different tests for distinguishing opportunistic from 
efficient breach. See Dodge, supra note 59, at 633 n.14 (listing authors who support punitive 
damages for opportunistic breach). To the extent that obstructive breaches are very likely to 
be opportunistic, my suggestion is consonant with these recommendations. 
133.  Efforts to avoid obstruction are wasted when they cost the promisor more than they benefit 
the promisee (by providing her needed assurance that she will recover for a first-order 
breach). At the time of formation, neither party wants a term that will result in such 
inefficient behavior, which decreases the total value of the transaction that the parties have 
to divide between themselves. In other words, the promisor is likely to pass some or all of 
the costs of wasted effort on to the promisee in the form of a higher price. 
134.  See Dodge, supra note 59, at 651-98 (recommending punitive damages for willful, as 
opposed to involuntary, breach). 
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damages to intentional and reckless obstructive breaches, the parties can give 
each other a reason to take only reasonable precautions against obstruction. 
Contracting for scienter also addresses two other costs commonly 
associated with extracompensatory remedies: promisee efforts to prevent, 
rather than promote, promisor performance and false allegations of breach. 
One answer to the first worry is that it is difficult for the promisee to interfere 
with the performance of no-obstruct duties. For instance, neither 
recordkeeping nor truthful reporting requires promisee cooperation—each is 
entirely in the power of the promisor. As for the second, the parties can choose 
to penalize only forms of obstruction where false positives are unlikely, 
diminishing the danger of false claims for breach. Contracting for scienter adds 
another layer of protection against both dangers. If it is difficult to induce 
obstructive breach in general, it is doubly difficult to induce an intentional or 
reckless obstructive breach. And adding a scienter requirement makes it even 
less likely that the promisee will win a nonmeritorious suit for obstructive 
breach. 
The remaining two reasons that penalties and punitive damages are usually 
inefficient can be dealt with in short order. If the promisor does not expect to 
obstruct recovery and is not worried about false allegations of obstructive 
breach, the extra liability costs him very little, meaning there are fewer costs to 
pass along. The result is likely to be positive for a risk-averse promisee. While 
she might pay slightly more for a penalty or punitive damages clause, the extra 
assurance of first-order recovery is worth the price.135 Nor need we worry so 
much about promisee overreliance on no obstructive breach. While first-order 
reliance often involves transaction-specific investment in the value-creating 
activity, when it comes to no-obstruct terms, the promisee is relying on the 
vindication of her legal right to recover for any first-order breach. It is hard to 
imagine what would count as overreliance on a legally guaranteed remedy. 
There is yet another cost to consider, one unique to no-obstruct duties. 
Chris Sanchirico has recently identified a commonly overlooked downside of 
penalizing certain forms of obstruction: the higher the penalty for attempts to 
avoid detection of a wrong, the greater the wrongdoer’s incentive to take 
additional steps to hide those attempts to avoid detection.136 There are two 
 
135.  This is another way of putting the familiar observation that extracompensatory remedies 
can be a cost-effective means of communicating a high probability of performance. See 
POSNER, supra note 125, at 128; Rea, supra note 63, at 156-57. 
136.  Sanchirico, supra note 17, at 1352-82. One difference between my category of obstruction of 
recovery and Sanchirico’s detection avoidance is that Sanchirico is mainly interested in 
criminal and regulatory sanctions. As a result, he focuses on how to prevent attempts to 
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negative efficiency implications. First, the resources expended on the added 
detection avoidance are “[f]rom a societal perspective . . . deadweight loss.”137 
Second, increasing the penalty for obstructive breach will be ineffective if that 
penalty does not deter the bad behavior, but instead results in successful efforts 
to obstruct recovery for the obstructive breach. That is, if Sanchirico’s analysis 
is correct, extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach have an 
inefficiency all their own. Penalizing attempts to obstruct recovery might not 
deter obstruction, but result instead in expenditures to obstruct recovery for 
the obstruction of recovery, and then attempts to obstruct any recovery for that 
obstruction, and so on.138 
Sanchirico’s argument, however, does not take full account of the fact that 
it becomes more and more difficult to avoid detection as one moves up the 
ladder to higher orders of obstruction. Fabrications become more complex and 
less plausible; the points of possible detection increase; the wrongdoer has 
fewer resources and options moving forward. A web of lies is less stable than a 
single lie, and the more extended and extensive the cover-up, the more costly 
and precarious it becomes. While in some cases penalties might make it worth 
 
avoid punitive first-order sanctions, a problem with a slightly different structure than trying 
to prevent attempts to avoid compensatory damages. 
137.  Id. at 1337; see also id. at 1352-60 (describing costs of detection avoidance). 
138.  The “and so on” leads Sanchirico to make another, more ambitious claim: 
Sanctioning activity X encourages another activity X+1 in the form of effort 
exerted to avoid detection of X by those who still choose to engage in X.  
Stating the principle in these general terms makes clear that it is recursive. 
Because the formula applies to any activity X, we are free to substitute “detection 
avoidance” itself for X, whereby it begets an X+1 equal to effort exerted to avoid 
detection of detection avoidance. Indeed, nothing stops us from returning to the 
formula with “detection avoidance of detection avoidance,” substituting this for 
X, and generating, as X+1, effort exerted to avoid detection of detection avoidance of 
detection avoidance. And we may continue like this ad infinitum, repeatedly 
inputting the last application’s output. 
Id. at 1368. I do not think the recursivity claim is essential to Sanchirico’s argument as a 
whole. In any case, it appears overstated. One typically says that a series is “recursive” only if 
its definition applies the same function to each member of the series to arrive at the next. 
But as Sanchirico recognizes, the incentives to engage in detection avoidance vary from one 
level to the next. Id. at 1369. A wrongdoer’s reasons to engage in X+1-level detection 
avoidance depend not only on the penalty for X-level detection avoidance, but also on the 
out-of-pocket cost of X+1-level detection avoidance, its chances of success, and its 
probability of detection. The latter factors vary stochastically from one level to the next, 
depending on the context. There is no a priori reason to think that there will not be some 
level of detection avoidance where the next higher level will, as a factual matter, be so 
difficult that it will not be worth the cost (perhaps even without a higher-order penalty), 
putting an end to the regress. 
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investing to hide one’s detection avoidance, rarely will it be worth investing 
significant additional resources to hide those investments. In many 
circumstances, even the first step will not be worth the effort. There is no a 
priori reason to expect that the parties will not be able to locate specific duties 
to cooperate in recovery that do not entail the special costs Sanchirico 
identifies. 
I conclude that attaching penalties and punitive damages does not cost as 
much when attached to obstructive breach as when applied to first-order 
breach. When those remedies are necessary to secure effective duties not to 
obstruct, the added benefit of making the deal happen may be well worth the 
cost of the extracompensatory remedy. 
B. Multipliers 
That penalties and punitive damages for obstructive breach can be worth 
the price does not entail that they are the most cost-effective response to the 
problem of underenforcement. There is another, more familiar solution: 
damage multipliers. Multiplying verified first-order losses by the reciprocal of 
the probability of enforcement ratchets awards up to where the risk-neutral or 
risk-preferring promisee is fully insured against breach, and the promisor has 
the right incentives to perform.139 Even if the benefits of an effective no-
obstruct term outweigh the costs of its extracompensatory remedy, a first-
order damage multiplier might bring the same or greater benefit at a lower 
price. 
The relative costs of different contract terms are highly fact dependent and 
vary from transaction to transaction. There might well be situations where a 
multiplier is the cheaper alternative, and perhaps the law should allow parties 
to opt for multiplied damages. But multipliers are not free. While a complete 
analysis of the relative costs and benefits, across different transaction types, of 
damage multipliers versus extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach 
 
139.  On the potential economic utility of damage multipliers, see Robert D. Cooter, Punitive 
Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143 (1989); and A. Mitchell 
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 
(1998). For some of the complications in establishing the proper multiplier and alternative 
approaches, see Craswell, supra note 127; and Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should 
Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 388 (2005). 
   The statement that multiplied compensatory damages give the promisor the right 
incentive to perform glosses over a number of complexities in the attempt to use a single 
remedy to induce both sides to behave efficiently throughout the entire transaction. See 
generally Craswell, supra note 124; Richard Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? 
Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 907-10 (2003). 
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would be interesting, here I will simply note some of the most significant and 
sometimes neglected costs of multipliers in the contract setting. I hope this will 
be sufficient to show that there are circumstances in which a duty to cooperate 
backed by penalties or punitive damages is the preferred alternative. 
Multipliers come in two basic varieties. Static multipliers are fixed by law 
or by contract, while dynamic multipliers are determined after finding a first-
order wrong on the basis of an additional finding as to the probability of 
enforcement. While a static multiplier corrects for the average or expected 
chance of nonenforcement, a dynamic multiplier corrects for the chance of 
nonenforcement in this case, taking into account the unique history of the 
transaction, including the defendant’s behavior in it.140 
Static multipliers are easy to administer, but have obvious drawbacks. 
Unlike penalties and punitive damages, which are meant to ensure 
performance, multipliers are supposed to ensure that the promisor fully 
internalizes the costs of his behavior (harm to the promisee) and therefore has 
the right incentives to perform or breach. If the multiplier is set by contract, the 
parties must predict the probability of enforcement in advance. When that 
prediction turns out to be wrong, the multiplier will result in too few or too 
many breaches. This is not a problem when it comes to penalties and punitive 
damages. By erring on the side of a greater sanction, the parties or the court 
can ensure that bad behavior is deterred for a range of enforcement 
probabilities.141 
 
140.  In practice, most multipliers are not simply dynamic or static, but somewhere in between, 
depending on how fine-grained or fact-dependent they are. The idea of a “perfectly” 
dynamic multiplier is a theoretical fiction, useful in my analysis, but not to be mistaken as a 
description of how any multiplier actually works. 
Richard Craswell reports: “[M]ost legal systems do not use multipliers that are 
calculated case by case. Instead, they use multipliers set at the same level for all defendants, 
or fines set at the same level for all defendants, or compensatory damages with no 
multipliers at all.” Craswell, supra note 127, at 2198. Craswell’s article provides the most 
comprehensive examination of the relative merits of static and dynamic multipliers. Other 
proponents of multipliers often ignore the issue. Polinsky and Shavell, who are relatively 
optimistic about the ability of factfinders to calculate the probability of enforcement, still 
recognize the danger of error and recommend that “the legislature . . . set damages 
multipliers for separate categories of wrongful conduct, based on rough assessments of the 
different chances of escaping liability in the various settings.” Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 
139, at 893. 
141.  This point is a variation on Robert Cooter’s observation that when “lawmakers can identify 
socially desirable behavior, but are prone to error in assessing the cost of deviations from it, 
then sanctions are preferable to prices.” Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1523, 1524 (1984). The multiplier option shows that the relevant difficulty can include 
not only “assessing the costs of deviation,” but also assessing the probability of enforcement. 
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But the problem with static multipliers is not only epistemic. A static 
multiplier does not change depending on the parties’ behavior. But the 
multiplier affects that behavior, and that changed behavior can in turn affect 
the actual probability of enforcement. Craswell describes potential benefits of 
this interplay.142 When good behavior leads to a lower probability of 
enforcement (e.g., in the regulatory context), a static multiplier gives potential 
defendants more reason to be good: doing so helps avoid even greater liability. 
But there is also the effect Sanchirico emphasizes: the more costly the remedy, 
the greater the incentive to engage in bad behavior to avoid it. Where the 
promisee is particularly worried about obstruction, she will not want a static 
multiplier, which would give the breaching promisor all the more reason to try 
to escape liability—all the more reason to obstruct recovery.143 It is true that the 
parties could choose an even higher multiplier to account for the new 
incentives—one that assumes obstruction. But now we are in the realm of the 
absurd: to secure efficient incentives for first-order breach, the parties contract 
for inefficient obstruction of first-order recovery. Rather than increasing the 
incentive to engage in such bad-faith behavior, it is better simply to prohibit it, 
which means a no-obstruct term backed by an extracompensatory remedy. 
Dynamic multipliers do not create new incentives to obstruct. Quite the 
opposite: a perfectly dynamic multiplier renders obstruction otiose. The more 
the promisor obstructs recovery, the lower the probability of enforcement, the 
greater the multiplier, and the greater the potential damage award. Whether 
the breaching promisor helps or hinders recovery, the anticipated, risk-
adjusted damage amount remains the same. A perfectly dynamic multiplier, 
therefore, both robs obstructive behavior of any benefit and perfectly insures 
the risk-neutral promisee against obstruction. Dynamic multipliers also share 
an advantage of generic fee-shifting and prejudgment-interest clauses: if it 
works, a dynamic multiplier applies to all postbreach obstructive behavior, 
whether anticipated in the contract or not.144 
 
142.  Craswell, supra note 127, at 2193-94. 
143.  Alan Schwartz has identified a related problem with static multipliers: because the 
probability that the promisee will sue is endogenous, a function of the damage measure 
itself, the parties will find it difficult to agree on the right multiplier. Schwartz, supra note 
64, at 399-401. And Ian Weiner notices a similar effect in criminal law: “Raising the 
sanction for the original crime may be counterproductive because it will increase the 
incentives for criminals to avoid arrest.” Ian C. Wiener, Running Rampant: The Imposition of 
Sanctions and the Use of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L.J. 2175, 2182 (1992). 
144.  Jennifer Arlen has observed that variable fines for corporate wrongdoing could, in theory, 
achieve similar benefits in the criminal context. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 849 (1994). Like me, Arlen thinks the 
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There is, however, that crucial caveat: if it works. Dynamic multipliers face 
new epistemic hurdles, for they work only if the promisor’s obstructive 
behavior’s effect on the probability of enforcement is both verifiable and 
quantifiable. There are reasons to expect that it will be neither. 
First, verifiability. If it is possible that the promisor will be held liable for 
the underlying breach though his obstructive behavior escapes detection or 
proof, the dynamic multiplier will not work. The promisor gets the benefits of 
obstructing recovery without paying all the costs, for in some possible futures, 
his obstructive behavior will not be factored into the multiplier. The same 
applies if there is asymmetric information about the effectiveness of an 
obstructive tactic—if the promisor knows that it is more effective than can be 
verified in court.145 
The second difficulty is quantifying the probability of enforcement. Even if 
the factfinder has perfect access to the totality of the facts surrounding the 
breach, including the defendant’s obstructive behavior, she still must be able to 
extrapolate from those circumstances the numerical probability that, at the 
time of nonperformance, the breach would be discovered and verified. There is 
no algorithm for arriving at that number. And while empirical studies might 
help in arriving at static multipliers,146 the facts and circumstances of each case 
are so different that they provide little assistance in calculating dynamic ones. 
Quantification requires a judgment call, based on the factfinder’s background 
 
costs of case-by-case calculations of the probability of enforcement “place this solution 
beyond the realm of realistic alternatives.” Id. 
145.  A society of econometric superheroes could address imperfect verification of obstruction by 
adding to the generic first-order multiplier a generic obstruction multiplier. Damages for 
first-order breach would then be multiplied twice. The first multiplier would take account of 
the probability of enforcement of the first-order breach, given all that is known about the 
situation, while proof of obstruction would trigger a second multiplier, designed to account 
for the possibility that those obstructive tactics might have gone undetected or unproven. 
Mere mortals will find this a difficult solution. First, calculating the appropriate 
multiplier would be more complex than simply multiplying by the reciprocal of the 
probability that the obstructive behavior in question would go unverified. Such simple 
multipliers work only where nonverification results in no damage award. In a dynamic 
multiplier regime, no proof of obstructive behavior does not result in no award, but in an 
award that is too low. Second, the problem of quantification is even more intractable in the 
case of obstruction multipliers, which require the factfinder to evaluate the likelihood that 
bad behavior that is designed to be hidden but has been discovered and proven might not 
have been. 
146.  See Keith N. Hylton & Thomas J. Miceli, Should Tort Damages Be Multiplied?, 21 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 388, 403-11 (2005) (deriving generic multipliers from empirical studies of different 
categories of tort litigation). 
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knowledge and situation sense. As such, it is not only inexact, but prey to 
familiar cognitive limitations and biases.147 
It would be wrong to draw too strong a conclusion. The point of a damage 
multiplier is to give the promisor the right incentives. A multiplier works, 
therefore, not when it accurately measures the objective probability of 
enforcement, but when it reflects the promisor’s perception of that probability. 
While cognitive biases might cause factfinders’ judgments to err systematically, 
some of those errors could track promisor judgments. Moreover, while 
verification difficulties systematically push damages below the ideal, 
quantification errors might be equally distributed above and below it. The 
breaching promisor, not knowing where in that range assessed damages will 
fall, will assume the average or ideal measurement (as he perceives it).148 
Nonetheless, verification and quantification are significant costs of dynamic 
multipliers. It is simply expensive to judge after a finding of breach what the 
probability of that finding was at an earlier time—expensive both in terms of 
the resources required to arrive at a figure and in terms of the risk of error. 
Again, penalties and punitive damages for obstructive breach can avoid both 
the verification and the quantification problems by erring on the side of a 
higher penalty. It is easier to deter than to internalize. 
Nor should we forget the other costs of supercompensatory damages for 
first-order breach identified in the previous section. Multipliers assume risk-
neutral or risk-preferring parties, while there are good reasons to think that 
most contracting parties are risk averse.149 Where the multiplier is dynamic, the 
vagaries of verification and quantification mean even more risk. And multiplied 
damages are likely to be especially salient or vivid. While perfectly rational and 
risk-neutral parties would not fear multiplied awards, in the real world they 
might well interact with the biases of risk-averse parties to deter efficient first-
order breach. More targeted no-obstruct duties backed by penalties or punitive 
damages provide an attractive alternative. There may be contexts where first-
order multipliers effectively address concerns about underenforcement, but 
 
147.  See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of 
Punitive Damages, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing 
Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2111-12 
(1998); W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in 
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 327-32 (1998). But see David Luban, A 
Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 369-70 (1998) (questioning Viscusi’s 
analysis of juror biases). 
148.  See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 139, at 892. 
149.  See Craswell, supra note 124, 664-65 (discussing risk aversion and the effect of multipliers on 
precaution decisions); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 139, at 886-87 (noting effect of risk-
aversion on optimal multipliers). 
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there are almost certainly transactions where the parties would reasonably 
prefer to contract for effective duties not to obstruct. 
conclusion 
The discussion in this Article has been fairly abstract, but its conclusions 
are of more than academic interest. Consider the Department of Defense’s two 
contracts with Halliburton subsidiary KBR to restore Iraqi oil infrastructure, 
known as “RIO” and “RIO2.”150 A 2006 House Minority report concluded that 
KBR had significantly underperformed on both contracts. More importantly, it 
found that KBR “leadership demonstrated minimal cooperative attitude 
resolving problems,” refusing to allow the government access to information 
that would verify its level of performance.151 For instance, it appears that early 
in its attempt to drill a pipeline under the Tigris River, KBR learned that 
geological conditions would likely prevent its successful performance. KBR, 
which was charging the government on a cost-plus basis, did not inform the 
Department of Defense of its probable nonperformance, but continued work 
and even took steps to hide the difficulties it was encountering.152 
Whether or not these reports are accurate (they have not been litigated), 
they illustrate why parties might want to write into their contract duties to 
cooperate in recovery for first-order breach. The RIO contracts probably 
include statutory terms requiring KBR to permit audits and other examination 
of records.153 But ensuring performance and recovery for breach might well 
require more: contractual duties to keep accurate records of work done, to 
cooperate in investigations, and, in the case of the Tigris River project, 
 
150.  See generally MINORITY STAFF OF THE SPEC. INVESTIGATIONS DIV. OF THE H. COMM. ON GOV’T 
REFORM, HALLIBURTON’S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE RESTORE IRAQ OIL 2 CONTRACT 
(2006). 
151.  Id. at 13. 
152.  James Glanz, Rebuilding of Iraqi Oil Pipeline as Disaster Waiting To Happen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
25, 2006, at A1. The Times quotes a senior Oil Ministry official, who “said he began hearing 
rumors from Iraqis in the ministry in Baghdad that something had gone terribly wrong, but 
the company itself seemed determined not to clarify what had happened. ‘We couldn’t get a 
good status report,’ Mr. Vogler said. ‘We kept asking for it . . . . We couldn’t get one.’” Id. 
The Army Corps of Engineers colonel in charge of the project told the Times that “KBR 
provided him with optimistic assessments nearly to the end of the line . . . and he was 
convinced that the project would be a success.” Id. 
153.  10 U.S.C. § 2313(a)-(c) (2007). 
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immediately to report obstacles to performance.154 This Article has shown that 
such contractual duties must be backed by extracompensatory remedies if they 
are to be effective. 
The above analysis recommends several possible reforms. The most general 
and effective would be to create an exception to the rules against penalties and 
punitive damages allowing parties to attach those remedies to the breach of 
duties to cooperate in recovery. Less generally effective, but still a step in the 
right direction, would be to clarify the availability of contractually specified 
adverse inferences conditioned on obstructive breach. Finally, within the 
contract-rule framework, courts should at least permit, absent contractual 
language to the contrary, compensatory damages for the additional litigation 
costs and prejudgment interest for the delays that obstructive breach causes. 
Courts or legislatures could allow parties to adopt some no-obstructive 
measures even without changing the law of contract by clarifying that the 
economic loss rule and other obstacles to tort liability in the contract context do 
not apply to fraudulent obstruction. Minnesota’s codification of the economic 
loss rule specifies that it “shall not be interpreted to bar tort causes of action 
based upon fraud or fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation or limit 
remedies for those actions.”155 This is the better rule (though possibly the 
wrong default), for it enables the parties to craft information-sharing 
contractual duties to increase the likelihood that, in the case of breach, recovery 
will be had. 
While I believe the analysis above fully supports these conclusions, I do not 
think it is the last word on duties to cooperate in recovery. At least three issues 
deserve further research. The first is an empirical hypothesis. This Article has 
considered only legal remedies for obstructive breach. In many contexts, such 
behavior will be subject to extralegal sanctions that are just as, or more, 
important to the parties. Most obviously, in long-term contractual 
relationships, obstructive breach may cause one side to end the relationship to 
the other’s significant detriment. Alternatively, in some settings obstruction 
might be subject to reputational and other extralegal sanctions. The central 
conclusion of this paper—that in many cases the parties want no-obstruct 
duties, but that to be effective, such duties must be backed by 
extracompensatory remedies—suggests that we should expect to find such 
obligations where nonlegal sanctions can step in to fill the gap. 
 
154.  Section 2313 stipulates that it is not to be read to require government contractors to keep any 
records other than those they would otherwise maintain in the normal course of business. 
Id. § 2313(c)(3). 
155.  MINN. STAT. § 604.10(e) (2000); see also Tourek et al., supra note 103, at 927-38 (describing 
history of Minnesota statute). 
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Second, having argued that the law should permit parties to choose 
extracompensatory remedies for obstructive breach, I have not yet fully 
analyzed whether or when extracompensatory remedies should be the default. 
The most generally effective default remedy for obstructive breach would be 
punitive damages. But one can imagine less radical measures, such as the wider 
use of adverse inferences. Determining the right default involves a variety of 
considerations, none of which are specific to the question of duties to 
compensate, but are worth exploring.156 
Lastly, my analysis of why the law might want to permit parties to specify 
penalties or punitive damages for obstructive breach has been largely 
instrumentalist, focusing on how the parties can structure their contracts to get 
the best incentives for the least cost. I have not considered how those remedies 
fare under any of the nonconsequentialist theories of contract law, many of 
which have their own arguments for or against the traditional prohibitions on 
extracompensatory contract remedies.157 And contractual duties not to obstruct 
raise nonconsequentialist considerations all their own. Such terms not only 
protect the promisee’s entitlement to first-order damages, but also modify the 
way legal entitlements and sanctions are enforced. Whether to permit the 
parties to contract for such duties, therefore, depends in part on whether or to 
what extent private persons should be ceded the authority to determine the 
enforcement mechanisms that support legally determined transaction 
 
156.  See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1591 (1999). 
157.  See, e.g., KIMEL, supra note 13, at 100-109 (arguing against specific performance remedy 
based on Mill’s harm principle); Ian R. Macneil, supra note 60 (applying reliance theory to 
justify rule against penalty clauses); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as 
Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 84-102 (2003) (maintaining that principles of 
corrective justice argue against punitive damages for breach of contract). But see Curtis 
Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 237 (2003) (applying corrective justice considerations to argue for punitive 
damages in contract). 
 Special mention should be made of Daniel Markovits’s suggestion that punitive 
damages might be appropriate whenever a promisor “refuses to pay the compensatory 
expectation damages that vindicating contractual collaboration requires.” Daniel Markovits, 
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1510 (2004). What Markovits is describing here 
seems to be, in my terminology, a duty not to obstruct, perhaps akin to that created by 
Seaman’s. But I believe that Markovits’s argument entails that both the obligation and the 
remedy are mandatory, since both derive from the promisor’s moral duty to treat the 
promisee as an end in herself. Cf. id. at 1505-08 (arguing that the parties should not be 
allowed to contract for reliance or other sub-expectation damage measures). 
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structures.158 The answers to such questions turn on considerations of political 
authority and legitimacy that are specific to this area of contract law. 
 
158.  I borrow this way of posing the question from Alan Klevorick: 
[T]he critical observation is that the explication of why some acts are crimes while 
others are not requires an inquiry into the legitimation of the transaction 
structure. It forces one to confront questions like: Why does the collectivity have 
the right to decide the terms on which particular transactions will take place 
under different circumstances? Why do some rights reside in the individual while 
others rest with the state? 
Alan Klevorick, The Economics of Crime, in 27 CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS 288, 303 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); see also Jules Coleman, Crimes and 
Transactions, 88 CAL. L. REV. 921, 924 (2000) (“[S]omeone who violates the transaction 
structure has asserted an authority that he does not possess. The power to set the terms of 
legitimate transfer resides in the political sovereignty and not in ordinary folk.”). 
